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456 __________________________________________ Mondialisation et propriété intellectuelle
1 INTRODUCTION
The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed an explosive growth of intellectual
property legislation in the advanced industrialized countries and an unprecedented
drive to harmonize intellectual property rights at the international level, which
initially culminated in the 1994 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”)1. Further efforts to consolidate and intensify
the level of harmonization reached under that Agreement have continued with
varying degrees of success. In 1996, two treaties regulating the transmission of
copyrighted works and related productions in cyberspace were successfully adopted
under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)2. A major
effort under WIPO auspices to further harmonize the international minimum stan-
dards of patent protection has also been launched3, but it is too soon to predict the
chances for a successful outcome. In contrast, efforts to harmonize the international
protection of databases have so far proved unsuccessful.
In 1996, a database treaty that the European Commission had put forward, in
connection with the WIPO negotiations on transmissions in cyberspace, ultimately
failed to win the support of other regional groups4. Since then, the inability of the
United States Congress to enact any form of database legislation has stymied further
multilateral undertakings on this topic. This impasse may soon be broken, however,
owing to the change of Administrations and to the appointment of new committee
chairmen in the United States House of Representatives.
This article will discuss the prospects for an international regulatory framework
for non copyrightable databases in the light of recent developments in the United
States. Part 2 will locate the database problem within the larger context of interna-
tional intellectual property protection, and it will demonstrate why the European
Commission’s 1996 Directive on the legal protection of databases5 represented a
radical departure from basic tenets of the classical intellectual property system
handed down from the nineteenth century. Part 3 will compare the existing E.U.
model of database protection with the two proposed models currently under
consideration in the United States, from which any compromise formula is likely to
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”), 15 April 1994, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994).
2. See World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, adopted at Geneva, Switzerland,
December 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997); World Intellectual Property Organization Performance and
Phonograms Treaty, adopted at Geneva, Switzerland, December 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
3. World Intellectual Property Organization, Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Draft Patent
Law Treaty (SPLT), WIPO Doc. SCP/7/3, March 6, 2002.
4. World Intellectual Property Organization, Draft Treaty on Databases, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6,
Aug. 30, 1996.
5. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal
protection of databases, 1996 O.J. (L77) 20 (“E.C. Directive on Databases”).
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be drawn. It ends with some reflections on the deeper legal and economic implica-
tions of these proposals.
Part 4 will then explore the implications for the international intellectual
property system likely to arise if the U.S. adopts a model of database protection that
differs significantly from that of the E.U. It proposes an umbrella treaty to bridge the
gap between high and low protectionist models. While a low protectionist outcome
in the United States is by no means certain at the time of writing, a careful
consideration of ways and means to reduce friction between countries that opt to
provide different levels of protection in the global marketplace seems merited at the
present juncture.
2 OF MARKET FAILURE AND THE DUAL ROLE
OF INFORMATION
Traditional collections of information that are distributed in hard copies, such as
directories, handbooks, and other useful compilations of facts or data, have long
enjoyed a kind of twilight existence in domestic and international copyright laws6.
These laws will protect collections of information that manifest a minimum quantum
of “original and creative authorship”, as typically revealed in the compiler’s criteria
for selecting, arranging, or coordinating the data assembled in any given compila-
tion7. The Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS Agreement”) recently confirmed this disposition by requiring all World
Trade Organization member states to protect “[c]ompilations of data or other
material, whether in machine readable or other forms, which by reason of the
selection or arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations”8.
2.1 Limits of the Copyright Approach
Once admitted across the threshold of copyright law, however, these “factual works”
are likely to receive only a “thin” scope of protection at the infringement stage.
Because facts themselves are not copyrightable subject matter, and only the creative
selection or arrangement is protectible, a second comer can, in principle, borrow the
6. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of
Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865 (1990); Jane C. Ginsburg, No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other
Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural Telephone, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 338 (1992);
Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United
States and Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151 (1997); Paula Baron, Back to the Future: Learning from
the Past in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO STATE L. J. 874 (2001).
7. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 449 U.S. 340 (1991); E.C. Directive
on Databases, supra note 5, art. 3.
8. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10.2.
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458 __________________________________________ Mondialisation et propriété intellectuelle
first comer’s disparate data while varying the organizational format9. To this end, the
TRIPS Agreement declared that “[s]uch protection… shall not extend to the data or
material itself”10, and it thus elevates the thin copyright doctrine of United States law
to a positive norm of world trade regulation.
This solution attempts roughly to reconcile the needs of those who invest in
publishing compilations of information with the needs of second comers to access
and use that same information and to recombine it in follow-on information goods.
The copyright approach thus strikes a balance between incentives to invest and free
competition that tends to err on the side of second comers. In effect, by severely
limiting the first comer’s derivative work rights, copyright law operates as a roving
unfair competition law that protects investors merely against wholesale duplication
of their information goods. In the United States, these limitations are thought to have
Constitutional underpinnings, in keeping with First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech and with the role of a robust public domain in sustaining democratic
discourse11.
This make-weight solution, however, always exposed commercial compilers of
information to a risk of market failure whenever the end product consisted essentially
of unprotectible data that a second comer could duplicate and rearrange at little cost
in time or money. In such cases, the first comer prospects the market at his own risk,
but finding himself exposed to instant copying, enjoys no period of natural lead time
in which to appropriate the fruits of his investment or to recoup prior losses on
unsuccessful essays. The second comer who free-rides on the information previously
compiled may price the information good below the first comer’s marginal costs and
drive him out of the market12.
When “facts are piled on facts”13, in other words, there is a classic public good
problem with real risks of market failure14. That condition characteristically ushers
9. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 349-351; Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing
Enterprises, Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir. 1991); Bellsouth Advertising & Publishing Corp. v.
Donnelley Information Publishing, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436, 1446 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Warren
Publishing Inc. v. Microdos Data Corp. , 52 F.3d 950, 956 (11th Cir. 1995).
10. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 10.2.
11. See generally Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial
Review in the Creation and Definition of Private Rights in Information, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535
(2000); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure
of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV.354 (1999); James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace:
Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177 (1997); Neil Netanel,
Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001).
12. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction
Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 528 (1981); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992).
13. Denicola, supra note 12.
14. See Laura D’Andrea Tyson & Edward F. Sherry, “Statutory Protection for Databases: Economic and
Public Policy Issues”, research paper prepared under contract to Reed-Elsevier, Inc. and the
Thomson Corp. , and presented as testimony on behalf of the Information Industry Association at the
Oct. 23, 1997, Hearing on H.R. 2652, the “Collections of Information Antipiracy Act”, held by the
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in a tension between states of chronic overprotection, in which courts reinforce the
compilers’ incentives to invest, and states of chronic underprotection in which users
and second comers tend to prevail. Between these extremes, there lie unanswered
questions about the economics of information goods in general and of the database
industry in particular. This uncertainty then hampers the quest for legal solutions that
could avoid suboptimal investment without impeding follow-on innovation and
without impoverishing the public domain15.
2.2 The Sui Generis Alternative
How to protect collections of information that failed to meet the technical eligibility
requirements of copyright law posed a hard problem that has existed for a half century
or longer, and at least three different approaches emerged over time. One solution
was to alter a domestic copyright regime so that it could accommodate and absorb
“low authorship” literary productions, with perhaps some adjustments to the bundle
of rights at the margins16. A second approach, adopted in the Nordic Countries, was
to provide a short-term sui generis regime, built on a distinctly copyright-like model,
that would protect catalogues, directories, and tables of data against wholesale
duplication, without conferring on proprietors any exclusive adaptation right like that
afforded to authors of true literary and artistic works17. A third approach,
experimented with at different times and to varying degrees in different countries,
including the United States, was to protect those who invested in compilations of
information against wholesale duplication under different theories rooted in the
“misappropriation” branch of unfair competition law18.
What changed in the 1990’s was the convergence of digital and
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S.
House of Representatives; G.M. Hunsucker, The European Database Directive: Regional Stepping
Stone to an International Model?, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 697 (1997). But see
David Fewer, Constitutionalizing Copyright: Freedom of Expression and the Limits of Copyright in
Canada, 55 U.TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 175, 177 (1997) (denying existence of market failure in
Canada); Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Database Protection: Is It Broken and Should
We Fix It?, 284 SCIENCE 1129 (1999) (no market failures in sight).
15. See J. H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV.
51 (1997).
16. See supra note 6; Denicola, supra note 12; see, most recently, Justin Hughes, Created Facts – Or the
Occasional Protection of Ideas, Names and Facts in Copyright Law (forthcoming 2002). The United
Kingdom absorbed factual works into copyright law. See, e.g., Baron, supra note 6.
17. See, e.g., Gunnar Karnell, The Nordic Catalogue Rule, in PROTECTING WORKS OF FACT 67 (E.J.
Dommering and P.B. Hugenholtz eds., 1991).
18. International News Service, Inc. v. Associated Press,248 U.S. 215 (1918); National Basketball Ass’n
v. Motorola Inc., 105 F.3d. 841 (2nd Cir. 1997). See, e.g., Jason R. Boyarski, The Heist of Feist:
Protection for Collections of Information and the Possible Federalization of “Hot News”, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 871 (1999); Brian F. Fitzgerald, Protecting Informational Products (Including
Databases) Through Unjust Enrichment Law: An Australian Perspective, 1998 E.I.P.R. 244.
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460 __________________________________________ Mondialisation et propriété intellectuelle
telecommunications networks, which potentiated the role of electronic databases in
the information economy generally, and which made scientific databases in
particular into an agent of technological innovation whose economic potential may
one day outstrip that accruing from the patent system19. The emergence of digitally
networked environments “has generated a host of new value-added services and
products, and appreciably increased the importance of this segment of the database
market”20. In a previous article, Professor Samuelson and I emphasized two reasons
why digital technology would cause the market for value-added data-based products
to flourish in the near future. First, “digital technologies facilitate the disaggregation
of value-added functions” and permit new forms of data aggregation and presentation
that were unavailable in print media. Second, “digital technologies foster new
functions, such as reformatting, filtering, and hot-linking, which have no
counterparts in print media”21. These predictions have held up over time, and there
is no doubt that the database industry as a whole, and its value-added components,
have in fact flourished despite constant allegations of market failure22.
Notwithstanding the robust appearance of the present-day database industry
under free market conditions, it was logical to ask whether suboptimal investment in
complex electronic databases would not inevitably hinder that industry’s long-term
growth prospects if free-riding second comers could rapidly appropriate the contents
of every successful new product without contributing to the costs of development and
maintenance over time. If, in other words, there existed a gap in the law, which neither
copyright nor residual unfair competition regimes adequately filled, then suitable
regulatory action to enhance investment might produce positive social benefits23. At
the same time, this utilitarian rationale raised new and delicate questions about the
prospects for high and unintended social costs likely to ensue if intellectual property
rights were injudiciously bestowed upon the building blocks of knowledge in general
or on the raw material of the information economy in particular24.
These uncertainties, in turn, raised a number of ancillary questions that required
serious theoretical and empirical investigation. First among these was the extent to
which any hypothetical impediments to investment were not being overcome by the
19. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman & Paul Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads: Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY L.J. 793 (1999)
[hereinafter Reichman & Uhlir (1999)]; cf. J.H. Reichman, Electronic Information Tools: The Outer
Edge of World Intellectual Property Law, 24 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 446 (1993)
[hereinafter Reichman, Electronic Information Tools].
20. Fewer, supra note 14, at 177; see also Hunsucker, supra note 14.
21. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15, at 125.
22. See Fewer, supra note 14 (case of Canada); Stephen M. Maurer, “Across Two Worlds: Database
Protection in the U.S. and Europe”, paper prepared for Industry Canada’s Conference on Intellectual
Property and Innovation in the Knowledge-Based Economy, May 23-24, 2001. See generally
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATABASES (1999) [hereinafter NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE].
23. See, e.g., Hunsucker, supra note 14; Tyson & Sherry, supra note 14.
24. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA (1997)
[hereinafter NRC, BITS OF POWER]; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15.
D
oc
um
en
t t
él
éc
ha
rg
é 
de
pu
is 
ww
w.
ca
irn
.in
fo
 - 
 - 
  -
 1
52
.3
.1
28
.1
1 
- 0
1/
08
/2
01
1 
21
h5
4.
 ©
 D
e 
Bo
ec
k 
Un
ive
rs
ité
 
D
ocum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info -  -   - 152.3.128.11 - 01/08/2011 21h54. © De Boeck Université   
Database Protection in a Global Economy __________________________________________ 461
database entrepreneur’s eagerness and willingness to invest anyway, in order to
capture real world economic opportunities25, and by the availability of self-help
technical measures which, in combination with residual legal measures, sufficed to
neutralize the risk of market failure. For example, electronic fencing through
encryption devices, coupled with tagging or watermarking of the data, make it
possible for online database providers to impose standardized contractual restric-
tions on all would-be users26. This restored power of the “two-party deal” in the
networked environment27 is so great, indeed, that critics fear it requires regulation lest
online database providers abusively alter the pre-existing balance between public
and private interests that the copyright law had previously sought to establish28. At
the very least, these critics argue that, given the power of self-help remedies in the
digital environment, contract and unfair competition law would suffice to close any
regulatory gaps that were likely to ensue in the short or medium term, without further
encumbering access to the public domain29.
If the lack of any trustworthy empirical assessments of market failure under
existing conditions thus made it difficult to ascertain the true need for regulatory
action, the enquiry was further complicated by persistent anecdotal allegations that
the database industry was dominated by sole-source providers who control niche
markets and who seek to impede access by value-adding competitors30. The Feist
decision in the United States, and many recent decisions under the E.U.’s database
legislation31, which is discussed below, fit this scenario. Given the opportunities for
value-adding uses that digital technology makes available, any appropriate
regulatory scheme should, in principle, seek to stimulate pro-competitive conditions
that lower barriers to entry and encourage follow-on applications. It should not
reinforce monopolistic tendencies that seem to plague key segments of the database
industry at the present time.
Another question of capital importance is the role that databases currently play
in both basic and applied sciences. Pre-existing legal regimes have treated scientific
data as a common resource available from the public domain, and the ethos of science
has been premised on a commitment to the free and open exchange of data to support
25. See Maurer, supra note 22; Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 14.
26. See NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 22.
27. J. H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights:
Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875
(1999).
28. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV.
111 (1999); Reichman & Franklin, supra note 27.
29. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Bott, Protection of Information Products: Balancing Commercial Reality and
the Public Domain, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 237 (1998); Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15.
30. See NRC, BITS OF POWER, supra note 24; NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 22.
31. See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, “The New Database Right: Early Case Law from Europe”, paper presented
at the Ninth Annual Conference on International IP Law and Policy, Fordham University School of
Law, New York, April 19-20, 2001, available at <http://www.ivir.nl/medewerkers/
hugenholtz.htm>.
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scientific hypotheses and published findings32. The traditional and customary
practice is accordingly for scientists to recombine data from existing databases into
new databases to be used as electronic information tools to solve hard new problems.
Any proposed regulatory solution must take these practices into account and avoid
disrupting the worldwide scientific networks that depend on the sharing of essential
data33.
From a related but still broader perspective, vast quantities of technical informa-
tion have always been freely available from the public domain, as a basic input of the
knowledge economy, where the technology-exporting countries’ comparative
advantages are most deeply rooted. In other words, information is both an input and
an output of the information economy34. This economy has grown to its present
magnitude under conditions in which entrepreneurs can only obtain exclusive rights
in downstream aggregates of information that rise to the level of patentable inven-
tions or copyrightable works of authorship.
Upstream flows of information have, instead, usually been subject to liability
rules35, such as trade secret laws and unfair competition laws sounding in the
misappropriation rationale, rather than exclusive property rights36. These liability
rules tend to repress market-destructive conduct without removing technical infor-
mation from the public domain. Any regulatory action must thus logically take into
account the unintended consequences that might flow from suddenly impeding
innovators and inventors from access to upstream information that has, until now,
been freely available as inputs into technological development.
These considerations about goals, in turn, should logically focus attention on the
choice of legal instruments to remedy any market failure that survived rigorous
empirical investigation. In recent years, for example, efforts to protect investors in
small-scale applications of know-how to industry from free-riding duplicators have
led either to broadening distortions of the patent and copyright paradigms or to a
proliferation of hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights, loosely based on
obsolete design protection and utility model regimes. These tendencies have caused
the patent and copyright systems to evolve in dangerously overprotective directions
while encumbering free competition with an array of miniature property rights that
32. See NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 22.
33. See Reichman & Uhlir (1999), supra note 19; see also J. H. Reichman & Paul Uhlir, Promoting
Public Good Uses of Scientific Data: A Contractually Reconstructed Commons for Science and
Innovation, paper presented at the Conference on the Public Domain, Duke University, November
9-11, 2001 (publication forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Reichman & Uhlir (2002)].
34. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 27; Benkler (1999), supra note 11.
35. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Alienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
36. J. H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2432 (1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal Hybrids]; J.H. Reichman, Charting the Collapse of the
Patent-Copyright Dichotomy: Premises for a Restructured International Intellectual Property
System, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 475 (1995) [hereinafter Reichman, Charting the Collapse].
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are cumulatively producing anti-competitive and anti-commons effects. My recent
studies demonstrate the need for a new kind of intellectual property regime, based on
liability rules rather than exclusive property rights, that could avoid market failure
without creating barriers to entry and without impoverishing the public domain37.
Such a regime, which I call a compensatory liability regime, solves the one key
problem that all the hybrid regimes of exclusive property rights have so far failed to
solve, namely that of deterring free riders without impeding follow-on innovation38.
Any serious quest for an appropriate sui generis solution to the question of
database protection would accordingly have engendered a serious investigation of
the comparative economic advantages and disadvantages of regimes based on
exclusive property rights as distinct from regimes sounding in liability rules. By the
same token, this investigation would also have to factor in larger constitutional
questions about the varying impacts of different legal regimes on freedom of speech
and on the conditions of democratic discourse. For example, the Constitutional
foundations of United States copyright law have always rested on a clear and sharp
distinction between facts and ideas that were freely available to all and the author’s
expression of facts and ideas, which could not be copied. Allowing exclusive
property rights to cover aggregates of data and information which had been
previously unprotectible must sooner or later pose fundamental Constitutional
questions for countries that take freedom of speech seriously, questions that a
creative use of liability rules might altogether avoid39.
All of these questions, taken together, suggested the need for long and careful
study and an extremely cautious approach to resolving a database protection
“problem” whose very existence had yet to be clearly demonstrated. Instead, the
European Commission, proceeding without answers to any of these questions, cut the
enquiry short by bestowing the strongest intellectual property right ever conceived
on publishers who contributed nothing more to the public good than “sweat of the
brow” investments in noncopyrightable compilations of facts and information.
2.3 A Leap in the Dark: The E.C. Directive on Databases
Against this background, the European Commission’s methodology in pursuing a
harmonizing regulation on databases is frankly puzzling to a foreign observer. One
looks in vain for empirical or economic studies to determine the size and nature of
37. See supra note 36; see also William Kingston, The “Thesis” Chapters, in DIRECT PROTECTION OF
INFORMATION, 1-124 (William Kingston ed., 1987); William Kingston, “Unlocking the Potential of
Intellectual Property”, paper presented to the Swedish International Symposium on Economics, Law
and Intellectual Property, Gotheberg, June 26-30, 2000 at 3-4.
38. See especially J. H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000).
39. See supra note 11; see also Paul J. Heald, The Extraction/Duplication Dichotomy: Constitutional
Line-Drawing in the Database Debate, 62 OHIO ST. L. J. 933 (2001); Marci A. Hamilton, A Response
to Professor Benkler, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 605 (2000).
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the problem to be solved, and one finds little or no academic literature evaluating the
Commission’s moves, let alone contesting or disputing them. On the contrary, there
is a strange and disquieting silence in which what we know derives essentially from
the self-serving legislative memorials that the Commission and its henchmen
promulgate at various stages of the legislative process40.
These memorials make little mention of the economic and political forces
lobbying for protection behind the scenes or the countervailing interests that were
likely to suffer according to the different solutions under consideration. We know
only that the calls for protection to which the Commission was listening had grown
ever stronger over time41; that a primary goal of the lobbyists operating behind the
scenes was precisely to control follow-on applications of noncopyrightable data
bases for the longest possible time; and that efforts by many of those who worked on
the Directive – especially the German copyright officials – to include a compulsory
licensing scheme as a quid pro quo for a strong property right were thwarted at the
last moment by back door maneuvers that have never satisfactorily been explained42.
The sui generis regime that the Commission ultimately adopted is like nothing
we have ever seen before. It protects any collection of data, information or other
materials that are arranged in a systematic or methodological way, provided that they
are individually accessible by electronic or other means. This does not, however,
imply that some organized form of storage is needed43. The criterion of eligibility is
a “substantial investment”, as measured in either qualitative or quantitative terms,
and the courts are left to develop this concept. That the drafters believed a relatively
minimal level of investment would suffice appears from an explicit recognition that
the qualifying investment may consist simply of verifying or maintaining the
database44.
In return for this investment, the compiler obtains exclusive rights to extract or
to utilize all or a substantial part of the contents of the protected database. The
exclusive extraction right pertains to any transfer in any form of all or a substantial
part of the contents of a protected database; the exclusive reutilization right covers
only the making available to the public of all or a substantial part of the same
40. For details, see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15; see generally Jens L. Gaster [Principal
Administrator, DG XV-E-4, European Commission, Brussels], The New E.U. Directive Concerning
the Legal Protection of Databases, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1129 (1997).
41. Maurer, supra note 22.
42. See, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15, at 82-83 (citing authorities); communication from
Prof. Justin Hughes (former official at USPTO responsible for database negotiations). The last
minute deletion of a compulsory license for sole-source providers radically changed the Bill that the
European Parliament had approved, and it left Parliamentary concerns about the lack of limitations
and exceptions with no credible answer. Yet, the Bill was adopted without being returned to the
European Parliament for reconsideration and approval in its final, much altered form. One can only
wonder if the lack of procedural purity should not constitute a fatal constitutional defect.
43. See E.C. Directive on Databases, supra note 5, art. 1(2); Hugenholtz, supra note 31.
44. See E.C. Directive on Databases, supra note 5, art. 7(1).
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database45. In every case, the first comer obtains a powerful adaptation (or derivative
work) right along the lines that copyright law bestows on “original works of
authorship”46, even though such a right is alien to the protection of investment under
existing unfair competition laws.
The Directive provides no major public interest exceptions comparable to those
recognized under domestic and international copyright laws. An optional but
ambiguous exception concerning illustrations for teaching or scientific research is
said to be open to flexible interpretation47, and some member countries have
implemented it in different ways. However, other countries have simply ignored this
exception altogether, which contradicts the Commission’s supposed concerns about
uniform law48.
The Directive’s sui generis regime does exempt from liability anyone who
extracts or uses an insubstantial part of a protected database. However, such a user
bears the risk of accurately drawing the line between a substantial and an
insubstantial part, and any repeated or systematic use of even an insubstantial part
will forfeit this exemption49.
Qualifying databases are nominally protected for a fifteen year period. In reality,
each new investment in a protected database, such as the provision of updates, will
re-qualify that entire database as a whole for a new term of protection. In this and
other respects, the sui generis adaptation right is far more powerful than that of
copyright law, which attaches only to the new matter added to an underlying, pre-
existing work50. As noted at the outset, the E.U. Database Directive thus breaks with
the entire history of intellectual property law by allowing a property rule – as distinct
from a liability rule – to last in perpetuity51.
Finally, the Directive carries no national treatment requirement into its sui
45. Id., art. 7(4); see Hugenholtz, supra note 31; Maurer, supra note 22.
46. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§101 (“derivative works”), 103, 106(2) (2002) [U.S.].
47. E.C. Directive on Databases, supra note 5, art. 9(b).
48. See NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 22, at 70-71; Reichman & Uhlir (1999), supra note 19,
at 803-04. One should note that one of the principle lobbyists supporting strong database protection
in both the E.U. and the U.S. is the world’s leading supplier of commercialized scientific
publications. One should also note that European governments that generate data may exercise either
copyrights or sui generis rights in their own productions, unlike the situation in the United States,
where the government cannot claim intellectual property rights in the data it generates and must make
such data available to the public for no more than a cost- of- delivery fee. See NRC, QUESTION OF
BALANCE, supra note 22, at 52-58.
49. E.C. Directive on Databases, supra note 5, arts. 7(2), 7(5).
50. E.C. Directive on Databases, supra note 5, art.10; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15, at 84-90.
51. Trademarks do last in perpetuity, but they do not protect innovation or investments as such, only the
signs and symbols that enable consumers to distinguish one producer’s goods from another’s.
William Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. ECON. 265
(1987). They are thus not legal monopolies, and because they protect only against acts that yield a
likelihood of confusion, there are historic questions about their status as “property” at all.
These historical debates in turn reflect confusion about the fundamental distinction between
exclusive property rights and liability rules, which have a different economic logic. See Calabresi &
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generis component. Foreign database producers become eligible only if their
countries of origin provide a similar form of protection or if, in keeping with a goal
attributed to the Commission, they set up operations within the E.U.52. However, non-
qualifying foreign producers may continue to invoke the residual domestic copyright
and unfair competition laws, where available, and the cases so far arising under the
various member’ implementing statutes suggest that both regimes may often remain
available to foreign parties53.
Without going further into detail, it suffices to point out that the new regime
embodied in the E.C.’s Directive on the legal protection of databases, adopted in
199654, broke radically with the historical limits of intellectual property protection in
at least three ways:
– It overtly and expressly conferred an exclusive property right on the fruits of
investment as such, without predicating the grant of protection on any pre-
determined level of creative contribution to the public domain;
– It conferred this new exclusive property right on aggregates of information as
such, which had heretofore been considered an unprotectible raw material or
basic input available to creators operating under all other pre-existing
intellectual property rights;
– It conferred the new exclusive property right in perpetuity, with no concomitant
requirement that the public ultimately acquire ownership of the object of
protection at the end of a specified period55.
In this and other respects, the E.U. model abolished the concept of a public domain
that had historically justified the grant of temporary exclusive rights in intangible
creations from the start.
The Directive on Databases then took the further step of denying foreign
producers protection unless their countries of origin had enacted comparable
legislation that met a standard of material reciprocity, notwithstanding the drive for
national treatment of intellectual property rights within the framework of the TRIPS
Agreement56. Needless to say, this requirement of material reciprocity has only
intensified the debate in the United States and in the rest of the world about the proper
Melamed, supra note 35; Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 36. Trademarks are “property” in the
sense that proprietors obtain legally enforceable entitlements; but that entitlement is only to avoid
deceiving or confusing consumers by the adoption of similar identifying symbols. While the
property-like status of marks has been strengthened against “dilution” in recent years, it confers no
rights in the underlying products of innovation or investment as such, which anyone remains free to
copy and sell under a different mark.
52. See E.C. Directive on Databases, supra note 5, art. 11; Maurer, supra note 22.
53. See E.C. Directive on Databases, supra note 5, art. 13; Hugenholtz, supra note 31.
54. See supra note 5.
55. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15, at 85-95.
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. However, material reciprocity may violate the residual
national treatment clause of the Paris Convention, which is actionable under TRIPS. Cf. United
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level of protection for noncopyrightable collections of data, which has impeded
further consideration of a harmonizing international treaty in the intervening years.
3 THE DATABASE CONTROVERSY
IN THE UNITED STATES
The situation in the United States differs markedly from that which preceded the
adoption of the European Commission’s Directive on the legal protection of
databases. In general, the legislative process in the U.S. has become relatively
transparent over time, and this transparency has generated a spirited and often high-
level public debate. The resulting controversy has, in turn, led to the crystallization
of two opposing coalitions that favor rather different approaches.
3.1 Transparency and Its Discontents
The coalition that supports a strong exclusive property right logically comprises most
of the world’s largest existing commercial database publishers. This “proponents’
lobby” has acquired the politically potent support of realtors, who seek to exclude
outsiders from access to their “multiple listings” databases, and of the New York
Stock Exchange, which seeks to control the release of stock market information to
nonmembers. The American Medical Association, which sells centralized diagnostic
data resources to doctors, also supports a strong intellectual property right. The
legislative “champion” of this coalition is the Chairman of the House Subcommittee
on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary (the new
and powerful Chairman of the latter Committee is said to sympathize with the
protectionist views of his Subcommittee Chairman).
The opponents’ ranks have swelled to include online service providers and
certain telecommunication companies; online stockbrokers; major information
technology companies, including dissident database publishers who license
considerable amounts of data from others; the United States Chamber of Commerce;
and an increasing number of diverse but powerful groups who fear rising costs for
accessing data in the future. Also active in this coalition are the representatives of
libraries, universities, and major scientific organizations. This “opponents lobby”
prefers either no database regime or a soi-disant minimalist regime sounding in unfair
competition law. It has found its legislative “champion” in the Chairman of the
Commerce Committee of the House of Representatives, who has taken a public stand
against enacting a strong exclusive property right to protect noncopyrightable
States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/
DS202/AB/R, January 2, 2002.
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databases while expressing favorable views about an unfair competition approach57.
In July of 1998, these groups participated in negotiations among stakeholders
that were held under the auspices of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary58. By that time, the opponents had also persuaded the Clinton Administra-
tion not to support efforts to launch an international treaty regulating databases, under
the auspices of WIPO, pending a Congressional decision concerning the proper
course of action. Once these negotiations failed, the opponents continued to block
adoption by the Senate of bills emanating from the House of Representatives’
Judiciary Committee. In 1996, this Committee’s proposal had taken the express form
of a sui generis intellectual property regime. From 1997 onward – as will be discussed
below – the House Judiciary Committee adopted the tactic of couching a database
right in “misappropriation” terminology, even though the regime it proposed to enact
was as strong or stronger than that adopted in the European Union59.
In August 1998, the Clinton Administration, which had been internally divided
on database protection since the end of the 1996 WIPO Diplomatic Conference,
issued a set of principles to govern the adoption of any database protection
legislation. Jointly drafted by the Patent and Trademark Office and the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, these principles represented a moderate compro-
mise among the various agencies and took the form of a letter to Senate Judiciary
Chairman Orrin Hatch and the Ranking Member Patrick Leahy60 (making it clear that
the Administration was prepared to bypass the House Judiciary Committee, if
necessary). Over time, the Clinton Administration issued comprehensive, detailed
analyses of the database protection bills in the House61, it exerted a considerable
57. See, e.g., Jonathan Band & Makoto Kono, The Database Protection Debate of the 106th Congress,
62 OHIO ST. L. J. 869 (2001).
58. For details, see Reichman & Uhlir (1999), supra note 19.
59. Communication from Prof. Justin Hughes.
60. Letter from Department of Commerce General Counsel Andrew Pincus to Senate Judiciary
committee Chairman Orrin Hatch and Ranking Member Patrick Leahy, August 4, 1998, available
at <http://www.acm.org/usacm/copyrightdoj-s2291.html>. The six principles had, as their
antecedent, a set of centrist principles issued by the USPTO in July 1998, marking the USPTO’s
departure from its previous strong property right advocacy. See USPTO Report on
Recommendations from the April 1998 Conference on Database Protection and Access Issues,
available at <http://www.uspto.gov/dcom/olia/dbconf/dbase498.htm>. In formulating these
principles, the Clinton Administration was influenced by Professor Justin Hughes, then in the
international division of USPTO, and by Professor Brian Kahin, then in the Science Advisor’s
Office.
61. See, e.g., The Administration Statement before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives, concerning H.R. 354, the
“Collections of Information Antipiracy Act”, 18 March 1999 [hereinafter Pincus March Testimony],
available at <http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106f/pincus0318.htm>; The Adminis-
tration Statement before the Subcommittee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives,
concerning H.R. 1858, the “Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999”, 15 June
1999, available at <http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106f/pincus0615.htm>. Both
statements were, again, the joint work of the USPTO and OSTP, with significant participation from
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and the National Science Foundation.
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restraining effect on the more extreme proposals, and in principle, its policies remain
in effect, although the position of the Bush Administration had yet to be determined
at the time of writing62.
Numerous public hearings over the years have generated considerable publicity
concerning the various legislative initiatives, and these forums have helped to raise
the level of controversy over time. At one point, editorials against overly strong
database protection appeared in the New York Times and the Washington Post.
Besides a series of Congressional Hearings sponsored and largely controlled by
proponents lobbying for strong protection, other public forums or inquiries were held
under the auspices of the Copyright Office, the Patent Office, and the National
Research Council (NRC). Major studies conducted by the NRC on this issue were
published in 199763 and, after extensive public debate and testimony, again in 199964.
Most recently, in the Spring of 2001, the U.S. State Department and the National
Research Council jointly sponsored a full-day’s Roundtable Discussion of pending
legislative initiatives, which drew an impressive crowd of stakeholders and
interested parties65.
The proposals for database legislation have spawned a vigorous and ever
growing academic literature66. Several economic studies have also appeared, which
predictably reach different conclusions depending on who commissioned them67.
There is also a spate of hard-hitting articles by respected Constitutional scholars, who
by different routes have raised serious doubts about the authority of Congress to enact
a sui generis exclusive property right at all and about the consistency of any such
regime with First Amendment prescriptions on freedom of speech68. This literature
reinforces earlier reservations expressed by the Department of Justice69, and it raises
questions about the ability of any high-protectionist regime to survive Constitutional
scrutiny, even if enacted.
62. Communication from Prof. Justin Hughes. In the summer of 2001, the new Department of Commerce
General Counsel, Ted Kassinger, and Justin Hughes of the USPTO, briefed the Office of Science and
Technology on the Administration’s past position, and informal reports indicate that most agencies
remain supportive of the Administration’s approach adopted in 1998-1999.
63. See NRC, BITS OF POWER, supra note 24.
64. See NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 22.
65. U.S. Department of State, Roundtable on Database Protection and International Science and
Technology Cooperation, in association with the National Academies, the American Association for
the Advancement of Science, and the Association of American Universities, Washington DC,
July 11, 2001.
66. See, e.g., supra notes 6, 11-12, 22.
67. See supra note 14; see most recently Yale M. Braunstein, Economic Impacts of Database Protection
in Developing Countries (February 2000) [commissioned by WIPO](finding that the strongest
possible form of database protection is the best of all possible solutions in the best of all possible
worlds).
68. See supra notes 11 & 39.
69. See Memorandum from William Michael Treanor, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of the Deputy Ass’t
Att’y Gen., to William R. Marshall, Associate White House Counsel, “Constitutional Concerns
Raised by the Collections of Information Antipiracy H. R. 2652” (July 28, 1998).
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Meanwhile, the database bills have become ever more controversial as more
sectors of industry discover that they, too, will be affected by the outcome, and the
ranks of stakeholders have continued to grow, both in terms of numbers and political
clout. Every new legislative initiative is, accordingly, subject to intense public
scrutiny, to loud and often acrimonious debate, and to considerable academic
analysis. However, none of this activity ensures that the U.S. will adopt a better
database law than that enacted in the E.U., nor does it guarantee that the U.S. model
ultimately enacted will differ in more than marginal ways from its European
predecessor. It does mean that very little will escape public scrutiny under the
pressures for transparency and domestic debate that have become too strong to resist.
Against this background, the House Committee Chairmen mentioned above
have recently pledged to reach some compromise solution during the present
legislative session, and they have summoned the contending coalitions to participate
in ongoing and relentless rounds of negotiations to this end. The outcome of these
negotiations remains uncertain at the time of writing. It seems clear nonetheless that
any viable database bill will be drawn from the two basic proposals that were still on
the table at the end of the last legislative session, which ended in an impasse.
These proposals, as refined during that session, represent the baseline positions
that each coalition carried into the current round of negotiations. One bill, H.R. 354
(as revised in January, 2000)70, embodies the proponents’ last set of formal proposals
for a sui generis regime built on an exclusive property rights model (although some
effort has been made to conceal that solution behind a title that evokes unfair
competition law)71. The other bill, H.R. 1858, sets out the opponents’ views of a so-
called minimalist misappropriation regime as it stood on the eve of the current round
of negotiations72.
3.2 The State of Play: Pending Legislative Proposals
In evaluating these proposals, one should bear in mind that neither of them is
particularly innovative, refined or well thought out, and both would institute
relatively strong forms of protection. There is reason to believe nonetheless that a
database bill premised on either of these models or on some hybrid combination
thereof stands a better chance of being enacted by the current 107th Congress than at
any time in the past six years.
70. See U.S. House of Representatives, House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 1st Session, H.R.
354, The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, Jan. 19, 1999 [hereinafter H.R. 354]. This Bill
was subject to proposed amendments on Jan. 11, 2000, which, however, were not formally submitted
as an amended proposal. The summary in the text sometimes reflects changes that were introduced
in publicly disclosed proposals for amendments.
71. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
72. See U.S. House of Representatives, House Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong., 1st Session, H.R.
1858, Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, May 19, 1999 [hereinafter H.R.
1858].
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3.2.1 The Exclusive Rights Model
The proposals embodied in H.R. 354 attempt to achieve levels of protection
comparable to those of the E.C. Directive by means that are more congenial to the
legal traditions of the United States73. The changes introduced at the end of the last
legislative session, in particular (often under pressure from agents of the past
Administration seeking to engender a compromise), softened some of the most
controversial provisions at the margins, while maintaining the overall integrity of a
strongly protectionist regime.
The bill in this form continues to define “collections of information” very
broadly as “information… collected and… organized for the purpose of bringing
discrete items of information together in one place or through one source so that
persons may access them”74. Here the overlap with copyright law is so palpable that
one can hardly conceive of any assemblage of words, numbers, facts or information
that would not also qualify as a potentially protectible collection of information.
Like the E.C. Directive, this bill casts eligibility in terms of an “investment of
substantial monetary or other resources” in the gathering, organizing or maintaining
of a “collection of information”75. It then confers two exclusive rights on the investor,
viz., a right to make all or a substantial part of a protected collection “available to
others” and a right “to extract all or a substantial part to make available to others”.
Here the term “others” is manifestly broader than “public” in ways that remain to be
clarified76.
H.R. 354 then superimposes an additional criterion of liability on both exclusive
rights that is not present in the E.U. model. This is the requirement that, to trigger
liability for infringement, any unauthorized act of “making available to others” or of
“extraction” for that purpose must cause “material harm to the market” of the
qualifying investor “for a product or service that incorporates that collection of
information and is offered or intended to be offered in commerce.” The crux of
liability under the bill thus derives from a “material harm to markets” test that is
meant to cloud the copyright-like nature of the bill and to shroud it in different
terminology77.
73. See generally Amanda Perkins, United States Still No Closer to Database Legislation, 2000 E.I.P.R.
366.
74. H.R. 354, supra note 70, §1401(1).
75. Id., §1402(a).
76. However, the second right represents a concession to the past Administration in that it foregoes the
general right to control private use that appeared in previous versions. This concession thus reduces
the scope of protection to a point more in line with the E.U.’s reutilization right, and it does not impede
personal use by one who lawfully acquires access to the database. See id., §1402(a).
77. See id. As originally deposited, H.R.354 spoke of “material harm to the primary market or a related
market” of the investor. Id. The analysis in the text is based on the more refined but unpublished
proposals of January 11, 2000. In fact, a “harm to markets” test is lifted bodily from §107(4) of the
Copyright Act of 1976, and it reflects the better view of what U.S. copyright law is all about. See J.
H. Reichman, Goldstein on Copyright Law: A Realist’s Approach to a Technological Age, 43 STAN.
L. REV. 943 (1991) (reviewing PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE (1990)).
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Here a number of concessions were made to the opponents’ concerns in the last
iteration of the bill (Jan. 11, 2000), some of them real, others nominal in effect. The
addition of “material” to the market harm test78, may, for example, address
complaints that proponents viewed “one lost sale” as constituting actionable harm to
the market. How much more trenchant a “material harm” test really is remains to be
seen.
At the same time, the revised bill contains convoluted and tortuous definitions
of “market” that the Administration hoped would reduce the scope of protection in
the case of follow-on applications79. On closer inspection, however, these definitions
provide a static picture of a moving target that amounts to a mostly illusory limitation
on the investor’s broad adaptation right80. In other words, notwithstanding these so-
called concessions, the bill effectively assigns most follow-on applications to any
initial investor whose dynamic operations expand the range of potentially protectible
matter with every up date, ad infinitum.
The bill then introduces a “reasonable use” exception that would presumably
benefit the nonprofit user communities, especially researchers and libraries81, and
that is meant to convey a sense of similarity with the “fair use exception” in copyright
law82. Once again, this resemblance turns out to become largely illusory on closer
analysis, because under the proposed bill, the very facts, data and information that
copyright law excludes have become the objects of protection, and there are no other
significant exceptions. Hence, virtually every customary or traditional use of facts or
information compiled by others that copyright law would presumably have allowed
78. H.R. 354, supra note 70, §1402(a); see supra text accompanying note 76.
79. “Market” is thus supposed to assimilate “all markets” in which a protected investor “derives or
reasonably expects to derive substantial revenue, directly or indirectly” as well as all markets in
which that investor “has taken demonstrable steps discernable to the public, to offer in commerce
within a short period of time a product or service” from which he expected to derive a substantial
revenue. H.R. 354, supra note 70, §§1401(3)(A), (B), with additional proviso added Jan. 11, 2000.
80. In principle, only actual, likely, or planned markets are protected under this scheme, which creates
a narrow opening for a value-adding competitor who arrives on the scene with an unlikely or
unplanned application. Even here, however, the definitions ignore the prospects that the initial
investor will continue to expand the range of projected investments over time and thus convert all
the tests to moving targets that constantly expand his potential claims to protected market segments.
In practice, moreover, database proprietors would be well-advised to “plan” for any market segments
they can remotely foresee over time and to craft their business plans in broadly worded terms
accordingly. Should by some miracle a second collector discover a surprise market niche to slip into
all the same, the initial proprietor’s most likely strategy would be to surround the second comer with
applications of his own, in order to limit the second comer’s field of expansion and to extract cross-
licenses wherever possible.
81. H.R. 354, supra note 70, §1403(2).
82. In copyright law, there is a thicket of exclusions and exceptions that must be worked through before
anyone can infringe. In particular, one cannot infringe for a taking of unprotectible facts or ideas, and
even a taking of protectible expression may be excused by codified exceptions for, say, teaching or
research. The “fair use” exception comes into play only as a last resort, to excuse marginal takings
by an alleged infringer that advance the public interest at a small cost to the proprietor. See 17 U.S.C.
§§107-122.
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scientists, researchers, or other nonprofit entities to make in the past now become
prima facie instances of infringement under H.R. 354. These users would in effect
have either to license such uses or be prepared to seek judicial relief for
“reasonableness” on a continuing basis. Because universities dislike litigation and
are risk averse by nature, and this provision puts the burden of showing
reasonableness on them, there is reason to expect a chilling effect on customary uses
of data by these institutions83.
The bill then recognizes an “independent creation” norm, which presumably
exempts any database, however similar to an existing database, that was not the fruit
of “copying”84. This provision codifies a fundamental norm of copyright law, and the
European Commission made much of a similar norm in justifying its own regulatory
scheme. In reality, this “independent creation” principle produces unintended and
socially deleterious consequences when transposed to the database milieu precisely
because the most complex and important databases become ever less susceptible of
independent regeneration as their value grows over time.
Sometimes the database cannot be reconstituted because the underlying
phenomena are one-time events, as often occurs in the sciences85. At other times, key
components of a complex database will have gone lost or missing, and they can no
longer be reconstituted with certainty at a later date. Any independently regenerated
database suffering from these defects would necessarily contain gaps that made it
inherently less reliable than its predecessors.
These problems point to a more general phenomenon that affects competition in
complex databases generally. Even when, in principle, such databases could be
reconstituted from scratch, the high costs of doing so – as compared with the add-on
costs of existing producers – will tend to make the second comer’s costs so high as
to constitute a barrier to entry. Meanwhile, the first comer’s comparative advantage
from already owning a large collection that is too costly to reconstitute will only grow
more formidable over time, an economic reality that progressively strengthens the
barriers to entry and tends to reinforce (and, indeed, to explain) the predominance of
sole-source data suppliers in the marketplace86.
As more and more segments of industry come to appreciate the market power that
major database producers could thus acquire under the proposed legislation, one after
83. Cf. Reichman & Uhlir (1999), supra note 19, at 812-20, 825-29. A further provision then completes
the sense of circularity by expressly exempting any nonprofit educational, scientific, and research
use that “does not materially harm the market” as previously defined. See H.R. 354, supra note 70,
§1403(b). Since any use that does not materially harm the market remains unactionable to begin with,
this “concession” adds nothing but window dressing. However, another vaguely worded exception
seems to recognize at least a possibility that certain “fully transformative uses” might nonetheless
escape liability, but this ambiguous proposal defies interpretation in its present form and remains to
be clarified.
84. H.R. 354, supra note 70, §1403(c).
85. See Reichman & Uhlir (1999), supra note 19, at 807-08.
86. See esp. Benkler (1999), supra note 11.
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another has petitioned the subcommittee for special relief. Thus, the bill, which has
now grown to some thirty pages in length, singles out various special interests who
benefit, to varying degrees, from special exemptions from liability. At the time of
writing the list of those entitled to such immunities included news reporting
organizations; churches that depend on genealogical information, notably the Mor-
mons; online service providers; and certain online stockbrokers87.
Government-generated data remain excluded, in principle, from protection, in
keeping with current U.S. practice88, which differs from E.U. practice in this
important respect. However, there is considerable controversy concerning the degree
of protection to be afforded government-generated data that subsequently become
embodied in value-adding, privately funded databases89. All parties agree that a
private, value-adding compiler should obtain whatever degree of protection is
elsewhere provided, notwithstanding the incorporation of government-generated
data. The issue concerns the rights and abilities of third parties to continue to access
the original, government-generated data sets, notwithstanding the existence of a
commodified embodiment. At the time of writing, the proponents were little inclined
to accept measures seeking to preserve access to the original data sets, but pressures
in this direction were building90.
H.R. 354 imposes no restrictions whatsoever on licensing agreements, including
agreements that might overrule the few exceptions otherwise allowed by the bill91.
Despite constant remonstrations from opponents about the need to regulate licensing
in a variety of circumstances, and especially with respect to sole-source providers,
the bill itself has not budged in this direction.
On the contrary, new provisions added to the last iteration of H.R. 354 in 2000
would set up measures that prohibit tampering with encryption devices (“anti-
circumvention measures”) and with electronically embedded or “watermarked”
rights management information, in a manner that parallels the provisions adopted for
online transmissions of copyrighted works under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 199892. Because these provisions effectively secure the database against
unauthorized access (and tend to create an additional “exclusive right of access”
without expressly so declaring)93, they would only add to the database owner’s
market power to dictate contractual terms and conditions without regard to the public
87. See H.R. 354, supra note 70, §1403(e)(f)(i).
88. See id., §1404.
89. See, e.g., Peter N. Weiss & Peter Backlund, International Information Policy in Conflict: Open and
Unrestricted Access versus Government Commercialization, in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 300, 303
(Brian Kahin & Charles Neeson eds., 1997).
90. See NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 22, at 102-105.
91. H.R. 354, supra note 70, §1404(e).
92. Cf. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 103, 112 Stat. 2860, 2863 (1998)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. 512, 1201), §§512, 1201, 1205.
93. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001).
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interest. These powers are further magnified by the imposition of strong criminal
sanctions in addition to strong civil remedies for infringement94.
The one major concession that has so far been made to the opponents’
constitutional arguments concerns the question of duration. As previously noted, the
E.C. Directive allows for perpetual protection of the whole database so long as any
substantial part of it is updated or maintained by virtue of a new and substantial
investment, and the proponents’ early proposals in the U.S. echoed this provision95.
However, the U.S. Constitution clearly prescribes a limited term of duration for
intellectual property rights96, and the proponents have finally bowed to pressures
from many directions by limiting the term of duration to fifteen years97.
Any update to an existing database would then qualify for a new term of fifteen
years, but this protection would apply, at least in principle, only to the new matter
added in the update. In practice, however, the inability to clearly separate old from
new matter in complex databases, coupled with ambiguous language concerning the
scope of protection against harm to likely, expected, or planned market segments98,
may still leave some loophole for an indefinite term of duration.
3.2.2 The So-Called Misappropriation Model
The opponents’ own bill, H.R. 1858, entitled “Consumer and Investor Access to
Information Act of 1999”, was put before the House Commerce Committee in 1999,
as a sign of good faith99. Critics have claimed that the opponents’ coalition seeks to
block the adoption of any database protection law and prefers simply to maintain the
status quo. In fact, this is true of some, but not all, members of that coalition.
Universities, for example, although allied with the opponents’ coalition for strategic
reasons, prefer a minimalist approach because they want some protection against
unauthorized commercial applications of their data without hindering access to data
for honest research activities. Over time, moreover, pressures for some form of
database protection have built up to the point where the minimalist alternative bill has
become a serious basis of negotiation, even though it remains poorly crafted and
contains numerous ambiguities.
H.R. 1858 begins with a definition of databases that is not appreciably narrower
than that of H.R. 354, except for an express exclusion of traditional literary works that
“tell a story, communicate a message”, and the like100. In other words, there is at least
94. See H.R. 354, supra note 70, §§1406-1407.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15, at 103-09 (citing
authorities).
96. U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 8.
97. See H.R. 354, supra note 70, §1409(i).
98. See supra note 80.
99. See H.R. 1858 (May 19, 1999), supra note 72. See also H.R. REP. NO. 106-350, PART-I (1999);
Perkins, supra note 73.
100. See H.R. 1858, supra note 72, §101(1).
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some attempt to draw a clearer line of demarcation between the proposed database
regime and copyright law, in order to reduce overlap or cumulative protection as
might occur under H.R. 354.
The operative protective language in H.R. 1858 appears short and direct, but it
relies on a series of contingent definitions that muddy the true scope of protection.
Thus, the bill would prohibit anyone from selling or distributing to the public a
database that is 1) “a duplicate of another database… collected and organized by
another person or entity” and 2) “is sold or distributed in commerce in competition
with that other database”101. The bill then defines a prohibited duplicate as a database
that is “substantially the same as such other database, as a result of the extraction of
information from such other database”102.
In other words, liability attaches only for a wholesale duplication of a pre-
existing database that results in a substantially identical end product. However, this
basic misappropriation approach becomes further subject to both expansionist and
limiting thrusts. Expanding the potential for liability is a proviso added to the
definition of a protectible database that treats “any discrete sections [of a protected
database] containing a large number of discrete items of information” as a separably
identifiable database entitled to protection in its own right103. The bill would thus
codify a surprisingly broad prohibition of follow-on applications that make use of
discrete segments of pre-existing databases104, subject to the limitations set out
below.
A second protectionist thrust results from the lack of any duration clause
whatsoever. In other words, the prohibition against wholesale duplication – subject
to limitations set out below – could conceivably last forever. This perpetual threat of
liability would attach to wholesale duplication of even a discrete segment of a pre-
existing database, if the other criteria for liability were also met. However, these
powerfully protective provisions, put into H.R. 1858 at an early stage in order to
weaken support for H.R. 354, are offset to some degree by other express limitations
on liability and by a codified set of misuse standards to help regulate licensing.
To understand these further limitations, one should recall that liability even for
wholesale duplication of all or a discrete segment of a protected database does not
attach unless the unauthorized copy is sold or distributed in commerce and “in
competition with” the protected database105. The term “in competition with”, when
used in connection with a sale or distribution to the public, is then defined to mean
that the unauthorized duplication “displaces substantial sales or licenses likely to
accrue from the original database” and that it “significantly threatens… [the first
101. See id., §102.
102. See id., §101(2).
103. See id., §101(1)(B).
104. The Clinton Administration expressed reservations about this de facto derivative-work right, which
is built into a regime that lasts forever. Communication from Prof. Justin Hughes.
105. See H. R. 1858, supra note 72, §102.
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comer’s] opportunity to recover a reasonable return on the investment” in the
duplicated database106. Both prongs must be met before liability will attach.
It follows that even a wholesale duplication that was not commercially exploited
or that did not substantially decrease expected revenues (as might occur from, say,
nonprofit scientific research activities) could presumably escape liability in
appropriate circumstances. Similarly, a follow-on commercial product that made use
of data from a protected database might escape liability if it was sold in a distant
market segment or required substantial independent investment.
H.R. 1858 then further reduces the potential scope of liability by imposing a set
of well-defined exceptions and also by limiting enforcement to actions brought by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). There are express exceptions for news reporting,
law enforcement activities, intelligence agencies, online stockbrokers, and online
service providers that are more or less comparable to those under H.R. 354107. There
is also an express exception for nonprofit scientific, educational, or research
activities108, just in case any such uses were thought to escape other definitions that
condition liability on unauthorized uses in competition with the first comer. Still
other provisions clarify that the protection of government-generated data or of legal
materials in value-adding embodiments remains contingent upon arrangements that
facilitate continued public access to the original data sets or materials109. A blanket
exclusion of protection for “any individual idea, fact, procedure, system, method of
operation, concept, principle or discovery” wisely attempts to provide a line of
demarcation with patent law and to ward off unintended protectionist consequences
in this direction110.
The provision that conditions liability for infringement on an official FTC
action111 was a tactical expedient devised to provide the House Commerce
Committee with some basis for asserting concurrent jurisdiction over database
legislation, along with that of the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property.
Most observers believe that the absence of any private right of action in H.R. 1858
as it stands constitutes a fatal flaw that would have to be removed in any final
compromise decision to adopt an unfair competition approach. A vocal minority of
supporters considers FTC supervision a necessary safeguard, especially in view of
the First Amendment tensions that any database protection law is certain to generate
in the United States.
106. Id., §101(5).
107. H. R. 1858, supra note 72, §§103(b), (c), 104(b), (e), 106(a).
108. See id., §103(d).
109. See id., §§101(b), 104(f). There are also express exclusions of telecommunications carriers’
subscription lists (e.g., telephone directories) and of securities market data. Id., §104(g). However,
the bill proposes an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that would prohibit the
misappropriation of “real-time” stock market information. Id., §201.
110. See id., §104(d).
111. See id., §107.
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A potentially more important set of safeguards emerges from the drafters’ real
concerns about potential misuses of even this so-called minimalist form of protec-
tion. These concerns are expressed in a provision that expressly denies liability in any
case where the protected party “misuses the protection” that H.R. 1858 affords. A
related provision then elaborates a detailed list of standards that courts could use as
guidelines in particular cases in order to determine whether an instance of misuse had
occurred112. These guidelines or standards would greatly clarify the line between
acceptable and unacceptable licensing conditions, and if enacted, they could make a
handsome contribution to the doctrine of misuse as applied to the licensing of other
intellectual property rights as well113.
In summary, the underlying purpose of H.R. 1858 was to prohibit wholesale
duplication of a database as a form of unfair competition. It thus set out to create a
minimalist liability rule that prohibits market-destructive conduct rather than an
exclusive property right as such114, and in this sense, it initially posed a strong contrast
to H.R. 354. Over time, however, different iterations of the bill, designed to win
supporters away from H.R. 354, have made H.R. 1858 surprisingly protectionist,
especially in view of its de facto derivative work right. The realities of the bargaining
process are such that concessions unwisely made to the high protectionist camp at an
earlier stage, for whatever tactical reasons, are unlikely to be withdrawn now.
3.3 Social Costs of Striking the Wrong Balance
Finding the right balance of public and private interests in a legal regime to stimulate
investment in databases would constitute a difficult task under the best of
circumstances. From an historical perspective, the patent and copyright paradigms
inherited from the nineteenth century were premised on the need to protect relatively
large-scale contributions of single authors or inventors that promoted “science and
the useful arts”115. Small-scale applications of know-how to industry were generally
relegated to unfair competition laws, especially trade secret laws or laws protecting
confidential information. In other words, investments in noncopyrightable
aggregates of information were normally protected under liability rules that
regulated the processes of reverse engineering and not under exclusive property
rights116. Yet, formal legal or economic analysis of liability rules in this context has
attracted relatively little attention in the literature117.
112. H. R. 1858, supra note 72, §§106(b), 106(b)(1-6).
113. These provisions could particularly assist judicial regulation of shrink wrap and click on licenses
affecting online distribution of software and other electronic information tools. See generally
Reichman & Franklin, supra note 27.
114. For early proposals to this effect, see Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15.
115. See supra note 96; Reichman, Charting the Collapse, supra note 36.
116. See most recently Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 38 (criticizing deviant regimes of utility
models and industrial design laws).
117. See, e.g., Gordon supra note 12; for recent legal and economic analysis of reverse engineering, see
Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111
YALE L. J. (2002).
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3.3.1 Exclusive Property Rights versus Liability Rules
Most of the economic literature that has so far addressed the topic of database
protection tends unconsciously to assume the premises that ultimately yield the
authors’ expected conclusions. Because most economists uncritically equate
“property rights” with “exclusive rights”, and because the risk of market failure
inherent in public goods is often efficiently overcome with “property rights”, these
studies usually end where they began, by endorsing property rights, usually the
stronger the better118. Such studies beg all the important questions that a deeper
knowledge of intellectual property law might raise, namely, what level and mode of
protection might produce the greatest amount of investment with the most acceptable
degree of social costs119.
The most fundamental question that these studies largely ignore is the extent to
which any exclusive property right might a priori constitute the wrong kind of
solution for a legal regime that aims to protect investment in compiling aggregates
of data as such. One would, indeed, expect or prefer economic analysis to focus on
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of using either exclusive property
rights or liability rules120 to address the underlying risks of market failure.
In this connection, a growing number of innovative proposals rooted in liability
rules have been put on the table in recent years, in addition to the better known
proposals for a more traditional unfair competition approach. For example, Wendy
Gordon has proposed a tort of “malcompetitive copying” that would rest on specific
economic criteria121. William Kingston has proposed a new type of liability regime
that would transform intellectual property protection from a duration-based calculus
of rights to an accounting-based calculus of rights premised on multiples of R&D
costs122. I have elsewhere proposed a “compensatory liability” regime that would
allow second comers freely to extract data from a protected database in order to
compete with value-adding follow-on products, so long as adequate compensation
was paid under an “automatic license” (not a compulsory license) for a specified
period of time123.
However, most economists engaged in this topic have so far ignored these and
other proposals largely because their economic models and premises simply do not
allow them to take liability rules into account. Others dogmatically castigate liability
118. See, e.g., Tyson & Sherry, supra note 14; Braunstein, supra note 67. For trenchant criticism of this
approach, see James Boyle, Cruel, Mean or Lavish: Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and
Digital Intellectual Property, 52 VAND. L. REV. 2007 (2000).
119. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Information Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property Theory,
20 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 897 (1988); Reichman, Electronic Information Tools, supra note 19.
120. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 35.
121. Gordon, supra note 12; see also Dennis J. Karjala, Misappropriation as a Third Intellectual Property
Paradigm, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2594 (1994).
122. See supra note 37.
123. See Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15; Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 38.
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rules in the abstract and postulate their inherent inferiority to exclusive rights124,
without devoting any serious attention to the social costs that critics of strong
database protection continue to fear.
As a result, formal economic analysis has so far taught us virtually nothing about
how to craft a protective regime so as to avoid market failure without stifling
competition and impoverishing the public domain. Small wonder that, amidst so
much uncertainty, the most credible economic advice has been that of Scotchmer and
Maurer, who advise against taking any premature action that might make the end
result far worse than the predicament from which we started125.
3.3.2 Legislating Without a Solid Empirical Foundation
There is still relatively little empirical evidence available with which to evaluate the
behavior of legal regimes capable of protecting large aggregates of data under either
exclusive property rights or liability regimes. In the United States, recent federal
appellate decisions have expanded copyright law to protect a growing number of
borderline compilations of facts and data that the Supreme Court’s 1991 decision in
Feist would logically exclude126. In so doing, these decisions deform the classical
copyright paradigm by extending protection to algorithms, facts and ideas as such.
Copyright law also provides a very long term of protection127. As currently
applied, it endows database proprietors with virtually unlimited powers to control
follow-on applications of functional and factual matter of all kinds, and it further
endows them with a de facto exclusive access right that governs online delivery of
digital information products. Stretching copyright law to cover electronic databases
thus merely conflates the idea-expression dichotomy, extends the scope of protection
to facts as such, and subverts the border with patent law128. It hardly represents a
sound and balanced alternative to the E.U.’s sui generis regime.
Disregarding copyright law, the ability of database producers to use self-help
adhesion contracts and encryption devices to protect online delivery has greatly
expanded129. However, such measures do not altogether close a gap in the law that
124. See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2655 (1994); Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Richard A. Epstein, “Steady the
Course: Property Rights in Genetic Material”, paper presented to the Intellectual Property
Colloquium, Washington University (of St. Louis) Conference on Law and the Human Genome
Project, April 12-13, 2002.
125. Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 14.
126. See, e.g., CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d
Cir. 1994); CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999); see generally Hughes, supra note 16.
127. See generally J. H. Reichman, The Duration of Copyright and the Limits of Cultural Policy, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 625 (1996).
128. See Hughes, supra note 16.
129. See NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra notes 22, 64-68. The efficacy of these measures remains
uncertain pending adoption or rejection of the Uniform Computerized Information Transactions Act
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opens when third parties not in privity of contract with the producer obtain access to
the contents of the database130. It will not do either to exaggerate or to underestimate
the extent of this risk.
That a codified, federal unfair competition law, sounding in the misappropriation
rationale, could fill this gap remains a valid theory. It would constitute a minimalist
response to a potential gap in the law whose true dimensions remain unknown, and
it could also provide the uniform model needed for proper administration of the
national system of innovation and for negotiating an international arrangement131.
However, any legislative initiative in this regard risks being captured by special
interests and converted into a high-protectionist exercise with serious unintended
consequences.
The empirical evidence drawn from judicial application of the E.C.’s Directive
on Databases so far sheds little light on the deeper issues. Most of the European cases
have invoked copyright law, contracts law, or unfair competition law (especially the
doctrine of parasitical copying) to reinforce or supplement conclusions reached
under the sui generis database protection laws as such. Moreover, most of the extant
European decisions deal with borderline subject matters under the old economy, such
as telephone directories, television broadcast listings, and real estate listings, but not
cutting-edge subject matter of the new economy, such as biotech databases132. The
E.U. case law to date confirms the existence of all the hard problems that the literature
has so far identified – the prevalence of sole-source providers; unreasonable
restrictions on licensing; barriers to entry; and impediments to follow-on applica-
tions of data133 – without a scintilla of evidence that the Directive has satisfactorily
resolved any of these problems.
(UCITA), proposed by the Uniform Law Commissioners, but adopted only in two states. This
proposed uniform state law enables providers to impose harsh terms against the world, and it could
disrupt the private-public balance embodied in the federal intellectual property laws unless courts
apply limiting doctrines, such as pre-emption, public policy or a public-interest unconscionability
doctrine. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 28; Reichman & Franklin, supra note 27. Even if UCITA
(which sixteen state attorneys-general opposes) fails to gain wide legislative support, the ability of
private contract law and self-help measures, especially encryption devices, to regulate online access
to databases relieves some of the pressure that would otherwise arise if cutting-edge databases were
primarily distributed to the public in hard copies.
130. See, e.g., Pro-CD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
131. See, e.g., Roger L. Zissu, Protection for Facts and Data Bases in the New World Order, 1998 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 271; infra text accompanying notes 176-93.
132. See, e.g., Hugenholtz, supra note 31; see also Maurer supra note 22; Rebecca S. Eisenberg & Arti
Rai, The Public and the Private in Biopharmaceutical Research, paper presented at the Conference
on the Public Domain, Duke University, November 9-11, 2001 (publication forthcoming 2002).
133. See, e.g., Simon Chalton, Database Right: Stronger Than It Looks?, 2001 E.I.P.R. 296; Hugenholtz,
supra note 31.
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3.3.3 A Market-Breaking Approach134
While the E.U. authorities loudly proclaim the success of their Directive135, the
evidence is inconclusive and at most supports a finding that the Directive has, as yet,
failed to produce the harmful long-term consequences that critics expect. The list of
critics who predict such consequences has grown, however, and the longer that the
sui generis database law is implemented in practice, the greater its socially harmful,
over-protectionist consequences appear likely in the long term.
To see why critics in the United States fear the long-term consequences of the
E.U.’s approach, it suffices to grasp how radical a change it would introduce into the
domestic system of innovation and to consider how great the risks of such change
really are. Traditionally, United States intellectual property law did not protect
investment as such, a tradition that still has Constitutional underpinnings136. At the
same time, the national system of innovation is premised on enormous flows of
mostly government-generated or government-funded scientific and technical infor-
mation (ST&I) upstream, which everyone is free to use137, and on free competition
with respect to downstream information goods.
The domestic intellectual property laws traditionally protect downstream
bundles of information in two situations only: copyrightable works of art and
literature, and patentable inventions. However, the following conditions apply:
– These regimes both require palpable creative contributions based on free inputs
of information and ideas;
– They both presuppose a flow of unprotected information and data upstream;
– They both presuppose free competition with regard to the products of mere
investment that are neither copyrightable nor patentable138.
As previously observed, the E.U.’s Database Directive changes this approach, as
would the pending parallel proposal, H.R. 354, to enact strong database rights in the
United States. Specifically, these sui generis regimes confer a strong and, in the E.U.,
potentially perpetual exclusive property right on the fruits of mere investment,
without requiring any creative contribution. They also convert data and information
– the previously unprotectible raw materials or basic inputs of the modern informa-
tion economy – into the subject matter of this new exclusive property right.
134. This section is based on Reichman & Uhlir (2002), supra note 33.
135. See Maurer, supra note 22.
136. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (rejecting International News
Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205
(2000).
137. See NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 22,at 4-8, 9, 52-58.
138. Id., at 9; see generally Reichman & Uhlir (2002), supra note 33.
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The sui generis database regimes would thus effectuate a radical change in the
economic nature and role of intellectual property rights (IPRs). Until now, the
economic function of IPRs was to make markets possible where previously there
existed a risk of market failure due to the public good nature of intangible creations.
Exclusive rights make embodiments of intangible public goods artificially
appropriable, they create markets for those embodiments, and they make it possible
to exchange payment for access to these creations.
In contrast, an exclusive intellectual property right in the contents of databases
breaks existing markets for downstream aggregates of information, which were
formed around inputs of information largely available from the public domain. It
conditions the very existence of all traditional markets for intellectual goods on:
– the willingness of information suppliers to supply at all (they can hold out or
refuse to deal),
– their willingness not to charge excessive or monopoly prices (i.e., more than
downstream aggregators can afford to pay in view of their own risk management
assessment), and on
– the willingness and ability of information suppliers to pool their respective
chunks of information in contractually constructed cooperative ventures.
This last constraint is perhaps the most telling of all. In effect, the sui generis database
regimes create new and potentially serious barriers to entry to all existing markets for
intellectual goods owing to the multiplicity of new owners of upstream information
in whom they invest exclusive rights, any one of whom can hold out and all of whom
can impose onerous transaction costs (analogous to the problem of multi-media
transactions under copyright law). This tangle of rights is known as an anti-commons
effect139, and the database laws appear to be ideal generators of this phenomenon.
Under the new sui generis database regimes, in short, there is a built-in risk that
too many owners of information inputs will impose too many costs and conditions
on all the information processes we now take for granted in the information economy.
At best, the costs of research and development activities seem likely to rise across the
entire economy, well in excess of benefits, owing to the potential stranglehold of data
suppliers on raw materials. This stranglehold will increase with market power if most
databases are owned by sole-source providers. Over time, the comparative advantage
from owning large, complex databases will tend progressively to elevate these
barriers to entry140.
139. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons
in Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998.
140. Accord Benkler (2000), supra note 11. All nonprofit activities will be especially hard hit. Over time,
lost opportunity costs in neglected research and development projects owing to these balkanized
inputs could become staggering, and many forms of innovation may stagnate as a result. Even so,
it will not be easy to document these lost opportunity costs, although the past experience of science
in this regard will be repeated across the whole information economy. For details, see Reichman &
Uhlir (1999), supra note 19.
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The potential social gains of a strong database law cannot justify incurring these
risks of disrupting or deforming the national system of innovation. It hardly seems
logical to disrupt all existing markets for intellectual goods just to cure an alleged
market failure for investments in a single type of intellectual good, i.e.,
noncopyrightable collections of information. At present, the U.S. dominates this
market, and there is no credible empirical evidence of market failure that could not
be cured by more traditional means141.
The foregoing analysis reinforces the hypothesis that an exclusive property right
is the wrong way to address the problem of legal protection for electronic databases,
and it reconfirms the desirability of fashioning a modern liability rule that could avoid
market failure without impoverishing the public domain. Supporters of strong
database protection laws (and of strong contractual regimes to reinforce them142)
believe that the benefits of private property rights are without limit, and that more is
always better. They expect a brave new world in which these powerful legal
incentives will attract huge resources into the production of electronic information
tools143.
In contrast, critics fear that an exclusive property right in noncopyrightable
collections of data, coupled with the proprietors’ unlimited power to impose
electronic adhesion contracts in the course of online delivery, will compromise the
operations of existing systems of innovation, which depend on the free flow of
upstream data and information. In place of the explosive production of new databases
that proponents envision, opponents of a strong database right predict a steep rise in
the costs of information across the global information economy and a progressive
balkanization or feudalization of that economy, in which fewer knowledge goods
may be produced as more tithes have to be paid to more and more information
conglomerates along the way144. In the critics’ view, the information economy most
likely to emerge from an exclusive property right in data will resemble models
already familiar from the Middle Ages, when goods flowing down the Rhine River
or goods moving from Milan to Genoa were subject to dozens, if not hundreds, of
gatekeepers demanding tribute.
141. See, e.g., Fewer, supra note 14.
142. See, e.g., Raymond Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and Intellectual
Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (1998); Maureen O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition
on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 561 (2001).
143. See E.C. Directive, supra note 5 (Recitals); Maurer, supra note 22 (describing and criticizing this
thesis); Tyson & Sherry, supra note 14; Braunstein, supra note 67.
144. Accord Maurer, supra note 22; Maurer & Scotchmer, supra note 14; Benkler (2000), supra note 11.
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4 MANAGING TRANSNATIONAL DATABASE
PROTECTION WITHOUT HARMONIZATION:
AN INTERIM SOLUTION
The European Commission wants other countries to emulate its Directive on the
Legal Protection of Databases145. In 1996, the Commission unsuccessfully sought to
persuade a WIPO Diplomatic Conference to adopt an international convention that
would have codified a sui generis regime built around a strong exclusive property
right146. This initiative was blocked by the combined efforts of scientists, universities,
libraries, independent database publishers, and telecommunications companies who
persuaded the U.S. Administration to withdraw its support.
While the future of database protection in the United States has yet to be decided,
it nonetheless seems clear that the present Administration will find itself compelled
to support some form of international database protection no matter which regime
Congress enacts in the end. In a worldwide digitally networked environment, the
ability of free-riding duplicators to download commercially valuable databases in
any territory that afforded them no protection whatsoever and to redistribute the
contents online at very low prices to willing purchasers in the rest of the world would
frustrate even a policy of soft protection for electronic databases (if it should
ultimately prevail)147. In the new information economy, in other words, the very
existence of an unregulated global market place puts purely territorial intellectual
property policies at risk of extraterritorial subversion and fosters a compelling need
for some form of transnational regulatory action.
How to meet this challenge without succumbing to high-protectionist demands
for uniform intellectual property standards that could adversely affect economic
growth in both developed and developing countries is a key challenge for internatio-
nal intellectual property relations in the post-TRIPS environment148. The question of
database protection thus presents an opportunity to forge cooperative multilateral
action in intellectual property law that advances the global public interest without the
harmonizing excesses that have elicited intense criticism of the TRIPS Agreement
and related high-protectionist undertakings149.
145. See E.C. Directive on Databases, supra note 5, art. 11.
146. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15.
147. See, e.g., Michael Freno, Database Protection: Resolving the U.S. Database Dilemma with an Eye
Toward International Protection, 34 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 165 (2001); Michael J. Bastian, Note,
Protection of “Noncreative” Databases: Harmonization of United States, Foreign and Internatio-
nal Law, 22 BOSTON COLL. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 425 (1999).
148. See, e.g., J. H. Reichman, From Free-Riders to Fair Followers; Global Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L & POL. 11 (1996/1997) [hereinafter Reichman, Free-Riders];
J. H. Reichman The TRIPS Agreement Comes of Age: Conflict or Cooperation with Developing
Countries?, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 441 (2000).
149. See, e.g., Peter Drahos, “Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-
Setting”, study prepared for the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, February 2002;
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In the rest of this article, I discuss both the risks of succumbing to a prematurely
harmonized international regime of database protection and the need to avoid a “trade
war” between high and low protectionists. I will then outline a proposal for a model
umbrella treaty, concerning the international protection of databases, which is based
on the solution earlier adopted in the Geneva Phonograms Convention of 1971150.
This proposal could enable all countries to cooperate in interdicting certain forms of
market-destructive conduct without creating barriers to entry or otherwise disrupting
their national systems of innovation.
4.1 The Risk of Premature Harmonization
If the U.S. adopted a strong database protection law along the lines of H.R. 354 as
outlined above, the differences between U.S. and E.U. law would be a matter of
degree, but not of fundamental conceptual importance. In that event, other developed
countries might feel constrained to follow suit – for example, Japan and Korea –
whether or not their governments were persuaded that this solution actually
embodied a proper policy response to the underlying problem151. The same holds true
for smaller countries seeking closer trade affiliations with the E.U. or the U.S., who
might have to accept an accommodation that exchanged high levels of database
protection for concessions concerning greater market access152.
On this scenario, a high-protectionist block installed at the heart of the interna-
tional intellectual property system would enjoy significant advantages in developing
any future blueprint for a multilateral regulatory solution. Only vigorous, persistent
and entrenched opposition by countries opposed to a high-protectionist regime could
then avoid an international framework modeled on joint E.U.-U.S. initiatives.
In theory, the developing countries could articulate an opponents’ coalition to
this end, in keeping with their general need to acquire both foreign technology and
see also Peter M. Gerhart, Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory – TRIPS as a Substantive Issue,
32 CASE WESTERN J. INT’L L. 357 (2000); J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the
TRIPS Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide
Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11 (1998).
150. Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of
Their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 309 [hereinafter, Geneva Phonograms Convention].
151. Japan has so far waited to see the outcome of deliberations in the United States. However, the
government of Korea has recently introduced a bill that would enact a strong exclusive property right
in databases, along the lines of the E.U. model.
152. Besides its dealings with would-be affiliates, the E.U. includes a harmonized database regime in
proposals for favorable trade agreements with Latin American countries. The U.S. has in the past
followed a similar strategy under the North American Free Trade Agreement, and would continue
its efforts to harmonize intellectual property protection under any proposed Free Trade Agreement
of the Americas. See generally SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998); Susan K. Sell, Big Business and the New Trade
Agreements: The Future of the World Trade Organization?, in POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING
GLOBAL ORDER (Richard Stubbs & Jeffrey Underhill 2000).
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the raw materials of the information economy at the lowest possible costs. In practice,
the ability of the developing countries to oppose a common E.U.-U.S. harmonizing
initiative, should they pursue it, seems doubtful.
As matters stand, these countries have showed little ability or inclination to
master the intricacies and nuances of older, established intellectual property regimes
– for example, the patent and copyright paradigms – so as to exploit the flexibility
remaining in the still only partly harmonized international intellectual property
standards of the TRIPS Agreement. Rather, they have been content, on the whole, to
criticize the inequities of the TRIPS Agreement at the margins, especially with regard
to so-called implementation issues, and to indulge in largely diversionary dreams
about the potential benefits from exploiting traditional intellectual resources153. This
inertia has left most developing countries dependent upon technical solutions that
intergovernmental organizations controlled by the donor countries make available,
and they are accordingly unprepared to play a leadership role in such a challenging
area. Even if some developing countries were to muster sufficient expertise and
initiative to form an international opponents’ coalition, they would still find it
difficult to organize as a block and to ensure that major players did not cut separate
deals with the advanced industrialized countries154.
For this and other reasons, it seems likely that, faced with a common E.U.–U.S.
approach, the developing countries would fall in line, in the hopes of gaining some
compensatory trade advantages in other areas. In that event, a relatively high and
uniform level of database protection would prevail at the international level, a result
which reduces uncertainty and lowers transaction costs. If, however, critics are right
in predicting that the social costs of strong database protection will greatly outweigh
any benefits in the long term, a premature but successful harmonization campaign
could mean that the entire world ended up with a socially harmful modality of
protection.
Such a sobering possibility merits further reflection. If it turns out that the E.U.
Directive embodies nothing more than a combination of ignorant tinkering and
special interest lobbying, then a mandatory, globalized regime along the same lines
would ensure that every national system of innovation would sooner or later have to
digest the fruits of a poisoned tree. In that event, any social gains accruing from
uniform law would gradually be offset by the social costs of diminished access to data
and information and by a progressive suffocation of those upstream processes of
scientific discovery and technical innovation that we now take for granted. To put it
bluntly, if the high-protectionist approach turned out to be a colossal blunder that
153. See e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
123-207 (2000); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (2001); J. H. Reichman, Taking the Medicine with Angst: An Economist’s View of the
TRIPS Agreement, 4 J.I.E.L. 795 (2001) (reviewing KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000)).
154. Cf. supra note 151 (case of Korea).
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balkanized the worldwide flow of scientific and technical information, the fact that
all countries now participated on an equal footing in the new feudalist information
economy would only magnify the unintended social costs155.
Aware of these risks, U.S. officials opposed to the E.U. model have taken the
view that the U.S. must put forward a credible alternative in order to avoid the
scenarios described above156. On this view, the benefits likely to accrue from
articulating a second, less protectionist modality (whatever form it may take as a
result of some compromise solution) would outweigh the costs of a socially
unbalanced uniform law that produced universally harmful results. Because many
influential stakeholders share this view, and it could prevail in the end, it is
worthwhile to consider the possible implications at the international level that might
flow from the existence of two different and competing models of database protec-
tion, one championed by the European Union and the other by the United States.
4.2 The Coming Database Protection War
In the event that the U.S. adopted a softer regime of database protection than that of
the E.U., the E.U. might be tempted to fall back upon the material reciprocity clause
it adopted in the Directive157. This provision was modeled on a similar clause inserted
in the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, which the U.S. unilaterally
adopted and then sought – more or less successfully – to impose on the rest of the
world158. Such a clause denies national treatment to foreign nationals or enterprises
that have no operational base in the E.U. unless their countries of origin provide
similar database protection to nationals of E.U. countries. It could thus expose
foreign database proprietors to some of the risks of unbridled copying that the
Database Directive sought to avoid with respect to E.U. citizens.
Such an initiative could have deleterious effects on the progressive development
of international intellectual property law, however, and would almost certainly fail
of its essential purpose in the end. The extent to which top-down harmonization
projects, like that embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, will ultimately strengthen the
global economic system remains to be seen159. It is well to remember, however, that
the TRIPS Agreement mostly embodied backwards looking technical solutions that
155. Cf. PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHEWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY? (2002).
156. Professor Justin Hughes, while working at USPTO in the period 1996-2001, deserves particular
credit for the Clinton Administration’s having articulated this policy.
157. See supra notes 52-53, and accompanying text.
158. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (1984), codified at
17 U.S.C. §901, 914; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 35-38.
159. For optimistic views, see, e.g., KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY 143-69, 235-43 (2000); GAIL E. EVANS, LAWMAKING UNDER THE TRADE CONSTITUTION, 107-
130 (2000); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts Should Create
Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000). But see Drahos, supra note 149; infra note 167.
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had emerged from the crucible of trial and error after long periods of divergent state
practice. The one thing we do know from two hundred years of empirical results is
that national treatment has been the sine qua non of bottom up, socially sound
evolutionary progress in new fields of intellectual property law160.
National treatment imposes a soft but critical economic discipline on all the
stakeholders who participate in an integrated marketplace. While ostensibly
allowing normative freedom in shaping any given state’s domestic intellectual
property regimes, it exposes the domestic beneficiaries of unilateral protectionist
incentives to the discipline of competition by foreign nationals who operate in less
regulated, more open economic arenas. So long as all stakeholders benefit from a
lowest common denominator that protects investors from market failure and that
ensures a reasonable ability to appropriate the fruits of their investments, the
requirement of national treatment acts as a cautionary brake or safety valve against
domestic self-indulgence in unilateral protectionist experiments161. In other words,
national treatment forces all the players to honestly evaluate different legal incentives
and, by exposing any single player who exaggerates the level of unilateral incentives
to global market discipline, it contributes to the experimental laboratory of trial and
error at the national level from which sound international minimum standards of
intellectual property protection may gradually and empirically emerge.
The absence of national treatment can, instead, produce an unhealthy
protectionist environment with centripetal effects elsewhere. Exorbitant protection
in one country, such as the E.U., on a condition of material reciprocity, can unleash
latent free-riding interests in other countries, some of which may be emboldened to
move to the opposite extreme and thus to legitimize local appropriation of foreign
investments in this and other areas. Without the self-discipline of national treatment,
the gradual crystallization of common measures to avoid market failure and to
promote healthy competition everywhere are subtly undermined162. Attempts to
corner the market for certain information goods by rigging legal monopolies in one
160. See, e.g., 1 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS – NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 62-68, 269 (1975); SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 1886-1986 at 919-21 (1987); Thomas Dreier, National
Treatment, Reciprocity and Retorsion: The Case of Computer Programs and Integrated Circuits, in
GATT OR WIPO? NEW WAYS IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 63, 67-70
(F.-K. Beier & G. Schricker eds., 1989).
161. See J. H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT
Connection, 22 VAND.J. TRANSNAT’L L. 747, 853-57 (1989) (citing authorities). Each state must
weigh the gains that might accrue from the stimulus of unilateral intellectual property incentives
against the potential losses on both local and foreign markets due to more competitive, less protected
producers. Conversely, states that ignore legal incentives that turn out to stimulate important new
creations elsewhere may find they lag behind the technological development curve precisely because
they have under-incented similar activities in their domestic economies.
162. See most recently United States – Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1998, Report of the
Appellate Body, WT/DS202/AB/R, January 2, 2002 (stating that national treatment is the cardinal
principle of the international intellectual property system) [hereinafter United States – Section 211
case].
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group of countries may thus trigger retaliatory and self-serving measures to enhance
the free-riding capacities of other countries, whose resort to nonreciprocity had
otherwise been legitimated. In this situation, a determined group of countries could
destabilize the database investment policies of others, who would find it difficult to
prevent leakage from low to high-protectionist markets.
There is also a risk that developing countries will begin to articulate hybrid
intellectual property regimes of their own in one field after another, including
databases, and that they may progressively deny foreigners access to those regimes
by invoking the E.U.’s own example. This is hardly a new risk. It was, indeed, the
message that E.U. authorities conveyed to the U.S. in 1984, when they suggested that
the reciprocity clause in the SCPA might turn out to be a grave political blunder163.
Meanwhile, a material reciprocity clause will not seriously deter U.S. database
companies from operating in Europe nor will it bring the U.S. into line. On the whole,
European courts applying the domestic database regimes have gone out of their way
to recognize alternative grounds of protection available from unfair competition and
copyright laws164. These forms of protection remain available to all U.S. companies
even if they are denied access to the sui generis database regimes. At the same time,
E.U. companies may become vulnerable to the products of more competitive
conditions in the U.S. and elsewhere, especially with regard to follow-on applica-
tions in which material taken from an existing database is combined with new matter
and new investments to produce improved databases for the same or distant market
segments.
The E.U. also remains heavily dependent on the U.S. for large amounts of data,
especially government-generated and government-funded data. If the E.U. were too
aggressively to enforce its material reciprocity clause and were to insist, for example,
on charging non-profit users in the U.S. for kinds of data that are supplied to the E.U.
gratis at present, the result would put severe strains on preexisting modalities for data-
sharing that have long been in place165. In such a case, authorities in the E.U. should
expect that the U.S. government would begin to retaliate by charging E.U. users
enough for its data to offset the costs imposed on U.S. users by E.U. suppliers of
comparable data. By dint of such a “poison pill” defense, in other words, consumers
in E.U. member states could end up defraying the costs of data that their own private
or public sectors were unwisely imposing upon both the public and private sector in
the U.S. Unfortunately, in such a retaliatory climate, the data-sharing ethos of the
scientific and research communities would certainly suffer, and the gaps in
worldwide database repositories that have already begun to appear are likely to grow
larger166.
163. See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 160. How free states are to avoid national treatment under new hybrid
regimes in the face of the residual national treatment clause of the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property remains to be seen. See United States – Section 211 case, supra note 162.
164. See Hugenholtz, supra note 31.
165. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir (2002), supra note 33.
166. See NRC, QUESTION OF BALANCE, supra note 22; Reichman & Uhlir (2002), supra note 33.
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The E.U., strong as it is, lacks the power to impose its model of database
protection on the rest of the world by dint of its material reciprocity requirement. If
good sense and self-restraint fail, the likely result of a database war would be a
renewal of free-riding practices in many developing countries and a resort to “poison
pill” retaliatory tactics by both public and private entities in the U.S. This scenario
suggests that, unless one side succeeds in persuading the other of the virtues of its
respective model, ways must be found to enable both models to coexist at the
international level with a minimum of friction.
4.3 An Umbrella Treaty with a Menu of Legal Options
Uniform international intellectual property standards cannot be achieved without
consensus. Efforts to impose uniform minimum standards of protection without such
a consensus discredit and ultimately destabilize the system as a whole. No matter
which Great Power assumes the universalist mantle – and it varies from century to
century – that vision of international intellectual property law is, and remains, what
Stephen Ladas described it decades ago, namely, a “polite form of economic
imperialism”167.
4.3.1 The Need for a Laboratory Approach
Harmonized law is, of course, not the same as uniform law. The elaboration of a
globalized marketplace logically entails a corresponding drive to eliminate market
distortions rooted in territorial laws. The TRIPS Agreement of 1994, with all its
rough edges, represents a case in point168. However, the drive for harmonization must
be handled with extreme caution when it concerns new subject matters of protection
regarding which there is relatively little historical or empirical evidence to support
a consensual regulatory framework. There is, in fact, much that we do not know about
the economic logic of intellectual property rights, and this ignorance is compounded
when the issue touches deviant or hybrid regimes that break with the dominant patent
and copyright paradigms169.
167. See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated and Overprotective, 27
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613 (1996); see also A. Samuel Oddi, TRIPS-Natural Rights and a “Polite
Form of Economic Imperialism”, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 415 (1996).
168. See Fred Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L LAW 689 (1989);
Marshall Leaffer, Protecting United Sates Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New
Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991). See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas
Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement
Together, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 275 (1997). The TRIPS Agreement was largely a backwards looking
document that addressed measures on which a broad consensus had long been reached at the technical
level, but that had remained unimplemented at the international level owing to political obstacles that
only compensatory trade concessions were able to remove.
169. See generally Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 36. Most scholars uncritically assume that the
logic of patents and copyrights (which they know) “more or less” applies to hybrid regimes (which
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Apart from these deep-seated conceptual problems, differences of opinion
concerning new subject matters of protection also reflect different social and political
contexts, different cultural traditions, different economic approaches, and different
value judgements about how production should be organized170. While the need to
respect differences of this kind constitutes a truism of enlightened intellectual
property discourse in general, that truism becomes compelling when the proposed
object of protection turns out to be facts, information, and data – the raw material of
the public domain, which U.S. courts and the Congress have consistently refused to
protect under preexisting intellectual property laws171.
The E.U. Commission, operating as it does under a well-known “democratic
deficit”, may continue to downplay concerns about restraints on free competition,
research, and freedom of expression that its Database Directive has triggered. These
concerns are much harder to ignore in the United States, where intellectual property
rights are constitutionally regulated and where the need to reconcile such rights with
the larger public interest in competition, research, and free speech has been enshrined
in a series of Supreme Court decisions172. Moreover, scholars and policymakers
everywhere should be concerned about the implications for democratic discourse of
any regime that impedes access to facts, information, and data that are the raw
materials of all other intellectual creations173.
Against this background, one cannot deny that proposals to establish exclusive
property rights in noncopyrightable compilations of facts represent the single most
sensitive subject matter ever to enter the canon of world intellectual property law. The
self-serving claims of the Commission that the database law “is working well”,
unsubstantiated as they are by any serious theoretical, economic or empirical
they know little or nothing about); and legislators have blindly followed the flawed historical models
established in the nineteenth century, namely, the domestic design and utility model laws. I have
elsewhere depicted these models as a false start that fails to solve the core problem of follow-on
applications of small-scale innovation in general; and I have challenged legal theory to consider that
what is most needed today is a new kind of liability rule that would operate as a floating or “portable”
trade secret law. See esp. Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 38.
170. See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain,
paper presented at the Conference on the Public Domain, Duke University, November 9-11, 2001
(publication forthcoming 2002); Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political
Economy of Information, Second Annual Meredith and Kip Frey Lecture in Intellectual Property,
Duke University, March 26, 2002. See also JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS: LAW AND
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE
FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001).
171. See, e.g., Heald, supra note 39; Benkler (1999), supra note 11; see also Hamilton, supra note 39.
172. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
173. See esp. David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & COMTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1981);
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L. J. (1990); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and
a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L. J. 283 (1996). See generally Papers presented at the
Conference on the Public Domain, Duke University, November 9-11, 2001 (publication forthcoming
2002).
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studies174, only make opponents elsewhere stiffen their resolve to prevent special
interests from cornering the markets for the raw materials of the information
economy.
It follows that the best outcome for the foreseeable future is a relatively
prolonged period of non-uniform, unharmonized approaches to the question of legal
protection for non-copyrightable databases. During this period, states should remain
free to experiment with different approaches consonant with their different economic
and social environments, which should, in turn, give rise to Ladas’ laboratory effect
and allow different solutions to compete for acceptance on the basis of their empirical
records175. Such a course of action could, however, deny investors in database
production many of the benefits that global regulation makes possible. Besides
creating serious obstacles to international trade, a total lack of consensus could result
in socially costly under-investment if the liberty to experiment in some countries
made it impossible for database producers to prevent free-riding appropriations in
other countries, especially those with access to a networked environment.
4.3.2 An Interim Solution
The question then becomes how to maximize local freedom to experiment with
different modalities of database protection while at the same time avoiding or
minimizing undue distortions to trade. The relatively short history of intellectual
property law suggests the answer. When universalist ambitions fail, and there yet
remains a common interest in regulating major subject matter areas that transcend
territorial intellectual property laws, the time-tested solution is to base international
protection on a few core principles that command universal respect. By the same
token, more detailed and specific standards of protection must be deferred until the
international community has the opportunity to accumulate and evaluate a wealth of
empirical knowledge about the different local approaches to database protection
undertaken in the interval.
The model that most logically responds to this solution is that of the Convention
for the Producers of Phonograms Against Unauthorized Duplication of Their
Programs (“Geneva Phonograms Convention”), which was opened for signature on
October 29, 1971176. The object of this treaty was “to fight the ever-growing practice
of record and tape piracy spawned by new reproductive technologies”177. Another,
more protectionist treaty had previously been developed on an experimental basis in
1961, namely, the International Convention for the Protection of Performers,
Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations of 1961 (“Rome Conven-
tion”), which entered into force on May 18, 1964178. However, the Rome Convention,
174. See Maurer, supra note 22.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 160-167.
176. See Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 150.
177. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 451 (Marshall A. Leaffer ed., 1997).
178. See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms, and
Broadcasting Organizations, opened for signature October 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter
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which covered some of the same ground as the Geneva Convention, created
substantive rights, known as neighboring or related rights, in phonograms (sound
recordings)179, which many states, including the United States, had declined to
recognize. In contrast, the Geneva Phonograms Convention adopted a minimalist
liability rule against the wholesale duplication of phonograms, but it did not mandate
the creation of any universally recognized intellectual property rights180.
The adoption of a liability rule against wholesale duplication permits
considerable flexibility with respect to modalities of implementation, and the Geneva
Phonograms Convention nicely illustrates this point. First, national treatment does
not, as such, apply181, without all the shillyshallying in this respect that became
necessary under the Rome Convention182. Second, the Geneva Phonograms Conven-
tion allows states broad freedom to choose the means of repressing “the making of
duplicates without the consent of the producers”183. It accomplishes this goal by
specifying a menu of legal options that include copyright law, neighboring rights law,
unfair competition law, and criminal law, from which states are free to choose184.
The model used in the Geneva Phonograms Convention addresses a number of
other issues that even a minimalist regime of database protection should take into
account, and it offers interesting solutions that could be adapted to the database
milieu. For example, the language that protects unauthorized duplication of
phonograms is circumscribed by a proviso that any unauthorized “making or
importation” should be “for the purpose of distribution to the public, and against the
distribution of such duplicates to the public”185. Private uses are thus left unimpeded,
and tension with the nonprofit sector is reduced, although not eliminated, since this
provision begs the question of distribution to the public without profit.
The Phonograms Convention does address nonprofit activities more directly in
Article 6, which allows states that implement their obligations either by means of
exclusive rights or by means of criminal sanctions to apply the same kind of
limitations as are permitted under their respective copyright laws. This provision
allows states even to impose compulsory licenses when “the duplication is for use
solely for the purpose of teaching or scientific research” and other limiting conditions
are met186.
Rome Convention]. See also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE ROME
CONVENTION AND TO THE PHONOGRAMS CONVENTION (1981).
179. See Rome Convention, supra note 178, arts. 5, 10-12.
180. See Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note150, art. 2 (obliging each contracting state to
“protect producers of phonograms who are nationals of other Contracting States against the making
of duplicates without the consent of the producer and against the importation of such duplicates”.).
Only duplicates intended for public distribution are actionable. See id.
181. See Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note150, arts. 2-3.
182. See Rome Convention, supra note 178, arts. 5, 16.
183. See Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 150, art. 2.
184. See id., art. 3; LEAFFER, supra note 177, at 451.
185. See Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 150, art. 2.
186. Id., arts. 6, 6(a)-(c).
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It appears that states choosing to implement the rule against wholesale duplica-
tion of phonograms under their domestic unfair competition laws may not directly
apply the exceptions allowed under Article 6, perhaps because unfair competition
laws are usually drawn in such a way as to limit their applicability to competitive
situations in which uses by nonprofit entities might ordinarily remain free.
Nevertheless, the importance of the nonprofit sectors that depend on access to data
is so great in the advanced technology-exporting countries that they would need
express exceptions and immunities in any minimalist database treaty that aimed to
repress wholesale duplication under the domestic unfair competition laws187. It is
worth noting in this regard that H.R. 1858 – the U.S. model closest to the Geneva
Phonograms Convention – attempts to close this loophole188.
The duration clause under the Geneva Phonograms Convention likewise
provides an interesting model for the database problem. The first sentences of Article
4 clearly allow states to contemplate an indefinite duration, which is consistent with
a pure unfair competition approach. For better or worse, this type of provision could
thus accommodate either H.R. 1858 in the U.S., which proposes an unfair
competition approach for an indefinite period of time, or the E.U.’s exclusive
property right, which perversely lasts forever. At the same time, Article 4 goes on to
recognize that many states will choose to impose a fixed duration for the protection
of phonograms, and here a minimum standard of twenty years was adopted189. An
analogous provision adopting a term of fifteen years for databases could reconcile
either of the models pending in the U.S. with the E.U. Directive.
The chief advantage of using the Geneva Phonograms Convention as a model for
an interim solution is that it could eliminate the ability of free riders to drag down the
level of global investment in databases, especially complex electronic databases,
without allowing owners of existing databases (or emerging conglomerates) to
colonize the global information commons by dint of a prematurely created and
conceptually unsound exclusive property right. Those states that chose to repress
wholesale duplication of databases by means of liability rules sounding in unfair
competition law (or more refined “compensatory liability regimes” along the lines I
advocate190), would remain free to do so, and the economic and empirical
consequences of their choices would become clearer over time. However,
participating states would not remain free to condone the assaults of free-riding
duplicators, which could distort the global marketplace for commercialized data
exchanges191.
187. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir (1999), supra note 19.
188. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
189. See Geneva Phonograms Convention, supra note 150, art. 4.
190. See supra notes 36, 38, 123 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 180. Nothing would impede the developed countries from pressing for such a
minimalist regime to figure as an effort to clarify the inchoate obligations of states under art. 10bis(2)
of the Paris Convention. See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, done March
20, 1883, as last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, art. 10bis (2).
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Over time, such a solution would provide all countries with a breathing space in
which to evaluate the costs and benefits of the different options under
experimentation. If the perpetual exclusive property right unleashed by the European
Commission turns out to be an enlightened tool for the development of the informa-
tion economy in the twenty-first century, its merits should become progressively
clear over time. If, instead, it proves to be a “monstrous caricature of true intellectual
property laws”192, one that expresses the worst features of an undemocratic, non-
transparent and all too corruptible political process, then the social costs it imposes
on healthy competition and technological development should also become evident
over time.
In either case, given a period of breathing space premised on a minimalist
liability rule against wholesale duplication, states should be able to ascertain those
positive aspects of the different protective models that interest them as well as the
negative aspects they wish to avoid. Over time, it should become possible
progressively to develop a worldwide database law through a process of negotiated
solutions drawn from the empirical laboratory of trial and error, and eventually this
process could be further enhanced by bringing it within the WTO framework193,
where social costs in one area may be offset by trade concessions in others.
4.4 Reducing Friction During an Interim Period
of Experimentation
The Geneva Phonograms Convention of 1971 seems already to have inspired the
drafters of the proposed minimalist unfair competition approach in the United States,
namely H.R. 1858194. If that proposal emerged as the basis for a compromise solution
in the U.S., the Phonograms Convention model becomes the logical tool for
reconciling the differences that would then exist between the E.U. and the U.S.195.
Even if the U.S. were ultimately to adopt a hard line, sui generis exclusive property
right, like that pending in H.R. 354196, the Geneva Phonograms model affords the
most frictionless method of reconciling an E.U.–U.S. high protectionist model with
any minimalist regime that might (hopefully, to my mind) emerge from the rest of the
world.
4.4.1 Tolerating Differences in the Levels of Protection
In any event, steps must be taken to preserve comity and reduce friction between
states having different approaches during what could become a fairly long
192. Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15, at 164.
193. Cf., e.g., TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, art. 39.
194. See supra note 72.
195. Cf. Freno, supra note 147, at 225; Bastian, supra note 147, at 463.
196. See supra note 70.
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experimental phase. A sine qua non of productive international cooperation would
then require the E.U. to forego its material reciprocity clause and to take other steps
to avoid even the semblance of a trade war with respect to database protection197.
Assuming that good sense prevailed and that database wars did not break out,
then one should expect to see different regional solutions to the database problem
emerge over time. The European Commission will continue to impose its perpetual
exclusive property right on its own member states and on a growing number of
would-be affiliates. A solid block of some fifty countries thus seems likely to form
in support of the high-protectionist model. If, meanwhile, the U.S. opted for a softer
alternative regime, it would logically attempt to win adherents to that regime in its
own regional trading spheres, such as NAFTA198 and the proposed Latin American
Free Trade Agreement. Whether Asian and African groups would coalesce around
either of these competing models or articulate models of their own remains to be seen.
In this state of affairs, access to protected databases and the relevant use rights
will require careful monitoring and negotiation from one country to another, and
from region to region, as has long occurred with respect to industrial designs. In
particular, the status of follow-on applications could vary considerably from one
jurisdiction to another. While a strong, exclusive derivative work right will often (but
not always) prevail in the European Union199, the status of follow-on applications in
other countries that adopt an unfair competition approach may vary considerably
with the extent of borrowing and individual investment in specific cases.
Consider, for example, that even if Congress enacted an unfair competition
approach like that in H.R. 1858, the drafters of that bill have unwisely conceded a
pseudo-derivative work right by making duplication of a discrete segment a second
ground for infringement, if other criteria concerning the impact on competition were
also satisfied200. Other countries, including the developing countries, might not
accept this concession, even if they signed onto a core principle that prohibited
duplication of a protected database as a whole. In that event, the actionability of any
given taking of a discrete segment of a protected database would vary with other fact
specific elements of the case at hand, such as the level of investment made by the
second comer and the extent to which his or her follow-on application competed on
197. The European Commission should understand that its own interests are best served by such a
cooperative approach. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66 (discussing the E.U. dependence
on massive imports of data from the U.S., especially data provided by U.S. government agencies at
low, marginal costs of delivery), and that neither country stands to gain from damaging each other’s
basic research and development prospects.
198. North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the United States, the
Government of Canada, and the Government of the United Mexican States, December 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
199. See, e.g., Chalton, supra note133; but see Hugenholtz, supra note 31 (discussing “spin off” defense
in Netherlands case law).
200. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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a distant market segment rather than head-to-head in the same market segment201. At
the very least, a considerable period of time might have to elapse before courts
following an unfair competition approach succeed in elaborating clear guidelines
applicable to the bulk of such cases even in the domestic laws.
In this connection, I cannot resist pointing out how much the compensatory
liability principle I have elsewhere advocated as the correct solution to the database
problem helps to simplify this and other thorny ancillary issues202. Under such a
regime, the database producer should always have a right to compensation for data
borrowed by a third-party for follow-on applications during a relatively short period
of time. However, the database originator should never have the right to prevent bona
fide follow-on applications requiring independent investment so long as a reasonable
royalty is paid for the data borrowed from the first comer’s product. Needless to say,
the first comer remains equally free to borrow back data from the second comer’s own
follow-on applications for similar competitive purposes, in return for similar
compensatory payments203. If developing countries decided, on their own initiative,
to experiment with a compensatory liability regime, even though neither the E.U. nor
the U.S. had endorsed it, we would have a true laboratory trial of all the principal
solutions on the table, and a real opportunity to test empirical results over time.
During this transitional period, one should expect database producers to rely
heavily on self-help measures that could limit their exposure to the vagaries of local
law. Foremost among these measures are technological anti-circumvention devices
that secure access to their databases and standard form contracts that regulate the use
of data made available to the public, once access had otherwise been lawfully
attained. These contractual practices could to some extent limit the disparities of
treatment that might otherwise flow from different levels of protection in different
groups of countries204.
Contractual restraints on use will, however, themselves be limited by the extent
to which different regimes apply different public interest exceptions; by the
willingness of different states to allow contractual overrides of these exceptions; and,
above all, by different concepts of misuse, including misuse of adhesion contracts205.
Countries that fear an excessive consolidation of powerful database suppliers, or that
fear the market power of sole-source providers wherever they operate, may thus opt
for more pro-competitive regulatory measures than in other, more pro-investor
201. See, e.g., Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 15, at 139-145.
202. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
203. See generally Reichman, Green Tulips, supra note 38. This solution is not to be conceptualized as
a “compulsory license”, because it does not cut back upon any exclusive property right to make
follow-on applications in the first place. Rather, the right to compensatory liability becomes an
entitlement, but one that does not include the right to hold out or otherwise prevent second comers
from borrowing the originator’s data for purposes of follow-on investments, in return for
compensatory contributions to the first comer’s own costs of research and development.
204. See, e.g., Maureen O’Rourke, supra note 142.
205. See, e.g., Reichman & Franklin, supra note 27; Lemley, supra note 28.
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countries, and this could further make the status of follow-on applications vary
considerably from one regime to another. Some friction will necessarily result when
follow-on applications originating from different systems compete head to head in
third countries, but it is hard to see how those third countries could fail, on the whole,
to benefit from such competition.
Besides reflecting different levels of competition dependent upon the different
legal responses to follow-on applications, the price structure in different countries
will necessarily vary with the level of per capita GDP, as already occurs with respect
to physical goods and to more traditional intangible creations. One can therefore
expect widespread price discrimination, with a view to making data available to
poorer countries at prices below those practiced in rich countries and also to avoiding
claims of abuse, like those being leveled at distributors of pharmaceutical products206.
At the same time, pressure will build to prevent re-exports of data and the leakage of
discounted data from poor countries to markets where higher prices prevail.
Controversies about so-called parallel imports of data sold cheaply abroad thus seem
likely to surface in this context207.
In this connection, developing countries may sooner or later also consider the
need to apply compulsory licenses to free up commodified data deemed essential to
national development goals. Here, again, friction can be reduced, but not altogether
eliminated by adoption of the interim model discussed above208 and by common
recognition of a compensatory principle, although the scale of compensation must
clearly bear some rational relation to the capacity of single countries to pay.
The application of competition laws (i.e., antitrust laws) to database producers
operating under an umbrella treaty would also continue to vary from country to
country, as it does today even under the TRIPS Agreement209. Absent greater
harmonization of such laws under the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations210, there are limits to what can be done to limit these disparities. One
206. Cf., e.g., Frederick M. Abbott, “The TRIPS Agreement, Access to Essential Medicines and the Doha
Ministerial Conference”, Occasional Paper 7, prepared for the Quaker United Nations Office,
Geneva (2001); Frederick M. Abbott, “Compulsory Licensing for Public Health Needs: The TRIPS
Agenda at the WTO After the Doha Declaration on Public Health”, Occasional Paper 9, prepared for
the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva (2001).
207. Cf. Frederick M. Abbott, First Report (Final) to the International Trade Law Committee of the
International Law Association on the Subject of Parallel Importation, 1 J.I.E.L. 607 (1998). Whether
importing countries that had opted for a liability rule sounding in unfair competition law could, in
good faith and without some logical incoherence, strictly apply a “first sale” doctrine against
countries that adopted an exclusive property right remains to be evaluated.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 176-93. While contractual, technical, and legal sanctions can
restrict such activities when they transpire within a given territory, they cannot necessarily regulate
activities in third countries with different regulatory frameworks and different needs to access data
from abroad.
209. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 8, 40.
210. See Ministerial Declaration, Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, ¶23, WT/MIN(01)/
DEC/1, adopted at Doha WTO Ministerial, November 14, 2001.
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solution would be to adopt common standards governing misuse as part of a
minimalist umbrella treaty, which courts in different countries could apply to
differing fact situations as they see fit211. If, at the end of the day, an interim umbrella
treaty left states free to apply both the competition rules and specific rules on
compulsory licensing that best suited their national development needs, pending
some future negotiating round, this would not differ appreciably from the situation
under the TRIPS Agreement’s patent provisions, which leave states great leeway as
regards both competition law in general and compulsory licenses in particular212.
Another contentious issue, and one that greatly aggravates the sole-source
problem, is related to the different philosophies surrounding government-generated
and government-funded data in the E.U. and the U.S. In the E.U., governments
generate proportionately less data than in the U.S., and they often want to exercise
“crown rights” in their data, on a par with private vendors. In the U.S., government
provides massive amounts of data at the marginal costs of delivery, and many regard
the provision of these data as a critical component of the national system of
innovation and as a critical determinant of the technological prowess of that
system213. Even in the U.S., however, pressures to outsource or commodify more
government data are building, and the potential impact of these pressures must be
taken into account.
On any scenario, these differences in the role of governments could become
constant sources of friction, although one way to attenuate them would be to stipulate
broad understandings concerning research uses of such data. Another means of reducing
friction on this score might be to develop novel approaches to preserving a dynamic
public domain for certain purposes, especially research and democratic discourse, in
order to promote public-interest uses of data without necessarily discouraging private
sector commodification. These topics are more fully explored below.
4.4.2 A Contractually Reconstructed Public Domain
for the Information Society
At the end of the nineteenth century, the very concept of exclusive property rights in
intangible creations was controversial. The industrial revolution, whose watchword
was free competition, had fulfilled the promise of innovation and economic growth
that the liberation of private enterprise from the tyranny of feudal privileges and
corporate guilds had bred214. If, over time, the social benefits that accrue from
211. Carefully elaborated proposals along these lines are incorporated into H.R. 1858, supra note 72, the
proposed unfair competition model developed in the U.S., and their incorporation into an umbrella
treaty at the international level would constitute a real accomplishment. See supra notes 112-13 and
accompanying text.
212. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 1, arts. 8, 30-31, 40; Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical
Products, Report of the Panel, WT/DS114/R, March 17, 2000.
213. See Reichman & Uhlir (2002), supra note 33; Bob Davis, The Outlook – Why Europe Trails U.S. in
High Tech Innovation, WALL STREET JOURNAL (April 1, 2002).
214. See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 167. Hostility to new, legislatively created legal monopolies was strong
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defending producers of intellectual goods from free-riding appropriators have
become more clearly recognized, the need to balance legal incentives to create
against the public interest in competition, research, and freedom of speech has
become equally well established. In Europe as in the United States, the common
thread underlying this accommodation of public and private interests was the primal
character of the public domain, from which all intellectual creators withdrew their
inputs and to which all intellectual creations were ultimately consigned215.
By the end of the twentieth century, these premises were everywhere under
attack. The notion that private property rights were inherently more productive than
legal forms of public regulation had been carried to great lengths in regard to the
production of physical goods, and similar principles had seeped uncritically into the
domain of intangible creations as well, under the slogan that intellectual property is
not different from other forms of property216. That slogan ignores the precise
behavioral characteristics of intangible creations – particularly their ubiquitous,
nonrivalrous, and inexhaustible character – that clearly do distinguish them from
physical goods. It ignores the vast nonprofit sector of activities that processes the raw
materials of intellectual creations and that aggregates these raw materials into distinct
packets of knowledge and information goods. It further ignores the central role of the
public domain in generating the upstream flows of data and information from which
both the public and private sectors necessarily draw in order to produce the
downstream applications of knowledge goods that attract intellectual property
rights217.
The Directive on the legal protection of databases, launched by the European
Commission in 1996218, carries the concept of private intellectual property rights to
the most extreme lengths history has ever witnessed. It establishes a perpetual
exclusive property right in the upstream collections of data and information that are
the raw materials of the downstream applications that previously entered the
intellectual property system. It then abolishes the very concept of a public domain and
ensures that private information conglomerates, built up over time, will
progressively own and control an ever greater share of the data and information that
has hitherto been freely available to entrepreneurs and researchers alike.
enough to cause some European countries to repeal existing patent laws and to cause others to defer
the enactment of such laws. See, e.g., Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the
Nineteenth Century, 10 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC HISTORY 1 (1950).
215. See, e.g., Boyle (2000), supra note 170; Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Innovation, paper
presented at the Conference on the Public Domain, Duke University, November 9-11, 2001
(publication forthcoming 2002).
216. See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights
Management” , 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998) (criticizing this movement).
217. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Digital Information, Digital Networks, and the Public Domain,
paper presented at the Conference on the Public Domain, Duke University, November 9-11, 2001
(publication forthcoming 2002).
218. See supra note 5.
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In evaluating this development, however, it is well to remember that the E.U.’s
Database Directive, although an extremely deviant form of intellectual property
protection, is not the only assault on the public domain, nor would the historic role
of the public domain necessarily be preserved if such a right were repealed or
abolished. This author has elsewhere compiled a list of some twenty-three
developments – legislative, technical, and economic – which in different ways all
encroach upon the historic functions of the public domain219 and give rise to what
James Boyle has called the Second Enclosure Movement220.
Among these developments is the fact that, when information is digitized and
transmitted via networked telecommunications media, the power of producers to
control the terms and conditions of use by combining technical protection devices
(especially encryption devices) with standard form adhesion contracts becomes
virtually unlimited, except in so far as courts or legislatures otherwise provide for the
public interest. In other words, cyberspace distribution of information restores the
power of the two-party deal to the point where intellectual property rights are less
needed to avoid market failure than they were, say, when the printing press was
invented221. Under these conditions, a primary effect of any new intellectual property
right may be to strengthen the de facto monopoly power of providers by
superimposing a legal monopoly that makes it ever harder for users, consumers, and
researchers to elicit public interest safeguards at either the judicial or the legislative
level.
Without delving further into these matters here, the point is that the nonprofit
sectors of the modern economy that have heretofore played such a critical role in
many national systems of innovation face new and serious threats under these
conditions. On the one hand, they can, of course, join the enclosure movement and
profit from it. Thus, universities that now transfer publicly funded technology to the
private sector can also profit from the licensing of databases222. On the other hand,
the ability of researchers to access and aggregate the information they need to
produce upstream discoveries and innovations may be compromised both by the
shrinking dimensions of the public domain and by the demise of the sharing ethos in
the nonprofit community, as these same universities and laboratories see each other
as competitors rather than partners in a common venture223.
Any long-term solution must accordingly look to the problems of the research
communities and of nonprofit users of data generally, in an increasingly
commodified information environment. As commodification proceeds and
intellectual property rights multiply, the functions of the public domain that are now
219. See Reichman & Uhlir (2002), supra note 33.
220. See Boyle (2002), supra note 170.
221. See Reichman & Franklin, supra note 27.
222. See, e.g., Eisenberg & Rai, supra note 132.
223. See, e.g., Reichman & Uhlir (1999), supra note 19.
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taken for granted may have to be reconstructed contractually by the nonprofit actors
engaged on specific projects224.
If the research communities decide to address these challenges frontally, they
may seek, of their own initiative, to recreate by consensus and agreement, a dynamic
public domain that could ensure a continuous flow of raw materials through the
national innovation systems, notwithstanding the pressures for commodification in
the private sector. In other words, universities and laboratories that depend on sharing
access to data may have to stipulate their own treaties and arrangements to ensure
unimpeded access to commonly needed raw materials in a public or quasi-public
dimension, even though each institution separately engages in transfers of informa-
tion to the private sector for economic gain225.
This idea of constructing a kind of nature conservancy or voluntary “E-
commons” for public access to scientific and technical information is currently under
investigation in the United States226. As applied to scientific research, this project
envisions the creation of a horizontal level in which data and information could be
exchanged freely and efficiently for nonprofit purposes without impeding further
commercialization at the vertical level. Ideally, both funding agencies and
universities would participate in constructing contractually the rules to govern this
“E-commons” and the means of administering it227.
This project was first discussed at a major conference on the public domain, held
at Duke University Law School in November, 2001228, and the National Academies
will sponsor a follow-up workshop on this same topic in September, 2002. If these
initiatives prove successful, then similar efforts would have to be undertaken at the
international level as well, in order to extend the benefits of a dynamic e-commons
to scientists and other research communities around the world.
Résumé
La protection des bases de données pose un problème majeur de politique législative en
matière de propriété intellectuelle. D’un côté, la protection par le droit d’auteur n’est ni
suffisante ni conforme aux principes du droit d’auteur. D’un autre côté, l’introduction de
nouvelles formes de protection va à l’encontre des structures traditionnelles de la
protection internationale de la propriété intellectuelle et risque soit de résulter en une
protection excessive bloquant l’accès en amont à des données nécessaires pour l’innova-
tion, soit de n’accorder qu’une protection sous-optimale entravant la création suffisante
de nouvelles bases de données. Face à ce dilemme, le législateur européen s’est décidé
224. For proposals to this effect, see Reichman & Uhlir (2002), supra note 33.
225. See generally id.
226. See, e.g.,LESSIG, FUTURE OF IDEAS, supra note 170; Boyle (2002), supra note 170; see also Lessig,
supra note 215.
227. For details, see Reichman & Uhlir (2002), supra note 33.
228. See Conference on the Public Domain, Duke University, November 9-11, 2001, papers available at
<http://www.law.duke.edu/pd.
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à introduire un droit exclusif de nature sui generis protégeant les bases de données,
lesquelles, tout en demandant un investissement quantitatif ou qualitatif substantiel, ne
remplissent pas le critère d’originalité du droit d’auteur. Par contre, le législateur
américain hésite toujours entre des propositions de loi de protection maximaliste ou
minimaliste. Après avoir expliqué le dilemme fondamental, le rapport analyse les
différences entre la solution européenne et les propositions américaines en les plaçant
dans leur contexte économique et politique. Un problème majeur du choix législatif est
l’absence de théories économiques qui soient suffisamment fondées empiriquement pour
permettre de trancher le conflit en connaissance de cause. Toutefois, ceci n’a pas empêché
le législateur européen de légiférer sans grand débat public alors qu’outre-Atlantique une
grande transparence du processus législatif a permis de porter le débat à un niveau
considérable sans pour autant faciliter le choix. Le rapport examine les données suscep-
tibles d’éclairer ce choix en faisant une comparaison détaillée des diverses solutions et
une critique des critères de protection retenus ou proposés – tels les critères d’investis-
sement, la durée excessive ou non de la protection, les exceptions multiples mais limitées
à la protection, etc. En outre, le rapport discute, à partir de la théorie de l’analyse
économique du droit, de l’alternative existant entre un système de protection par droits
exclusifs – approche de la propriété intellectuelle ou « property approach » – et un
système de protection par simple compensation – approche de la responsabilité pour
concurrence déloyale ou « liability approach ». Le rapport conclut que, dans l’état actuel
des connaissances de l’opération et des effets économiques d’un système quelconque de
protection, la prudence s’impose, et préconise donc le choix d’une solution minimaliste.
Il défend également cette solution pour des raisons de principe. Parmi celles-ci figurent
notamment des considérations tenant au système international de protection des bases de
données. L’établissement d’un tel système est indispensable vu l’ubiquité des biens
informationnels, telles les bases de données, et vu la nature, essentiellement globale, de
leur exploitation. Cependant, une protection internationale présuppose un effort global
d’harmonisation puisque l’accord ADPIC ne couvre que la protection des bases de
données par le droit d’auteur. Étant donné l’incertitude quant à la forme adéquate de
protection des bases de données, incertitude qui découle de la nouveauté de celles-ci et
de la méconnaissance de leur potentiel économique, il serait hasardeux d’établir ou, pire,
d’imposer, par voie d’harmonisation, une protection absolue. En effet, si les risques
macroéconomiques d’une telle protection se réalisaient, ils seraient de nature globale et
heurteraient tous les pays – à des degés différents suivant la situation économique de
ceux-ci. C’est pourquoi le rapport préconise un accord cadre d’harmonisation qui
combinerait une protection minimaliste avec la faculté pour les États d’expérimenter des
formes de protection plus étendue et plus conforme à leurs intérêts économiques. Bref,
la mondialisation de l’exploitation et de la protection des bases de données demande non
pas une harmonisation totale, mais une diversité de modes de protection à partir d’une
protection minimum assurant une concurrence loyale sur le plan mondial.
H. U.
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